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Until 1938, federal courts routinely -created their own
interpretations of substantive state law in the guise of creating a
"federal common law." They had been empowered to do so in
1842 by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Swift v.
Tyson.1 This lack of deference to state courts created two major
interjudicial problems.
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First, federal courts deciding diversity cases generally ended up
interpreting state law, allowing independent federal court
judgments over what state law required. All too often, this created
two conflicting systems of rights. Citizens of a state could only
have their rights decided by their own state courts. A non-citizen,
however, could and often did exploit diversity jurisdiction to move
a case to federal court and seek there an entirely different and
much more favorable reading of state law from a federal judge.
This dual system of law denied state citizens the same rights and
protections as non-citizens; the latter had a unique chance to thwart
state law by securing a different rule in federal court. Thus, non-
citizen litigants, often powerful and distant corporations, had
available a special procedure allowing them to attempt to evade
state rules that would have held them liable under settled state
precedent.
Second, permitting federal judges to essentially tell their state
counterparts that the latter did not know how to interpret their own
law betrayed a strong institutional disregard for the capabilities of
state courts. The Swift v. Tyson system, where state law decisions
were made by federal judges, men nominated by the President and
confirmed by the United States Senate yet often having no link at
all to the state whose law was in question, ran contrary to the
federalist structure in the Constitution and injected constitutionally
suspect friction into the relationship between the state and federal
judiciaries.
The Supreme Court reversed Swift v. Tyson and required
federal courts to follow substantive state law in 1938 in Erie
Railroad Company v. Tompkins.2 This decision announced a new
rule of deference to state judicial opinions. In an eloquent opinion
by Justice Louis D. Brandeis, Erie held that federal judges in
diversity cases who refused to follow state court decisions denied
state citizens protection of the law equal to that given non-citizens
Louisiana state courts; infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text discuss
Vermillion Parish.
The author is particularly grateful to Robert C. Josefsberg and Jerald Block
for their comments and suggestions during the writing of this article.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
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and, in an independent constitutional affront, thwarted the
Constitution's federalist structure.3
Since Erie, it has become well settled that federal courts are
bound to follow a state supreme court's interpretation of its own
law, and that federal deference to the state system extends to
intermediate state courts as well "in the absence of other
persuasive data."4 "Other persuasive data" cannot just mean that a
federal judge thinks a state judge got it wrong, or even very, very
wrong. That would be a rule of no real deference. "Other
persuasive data" means that there must be a specific, demonstrable
reason within state law or some new fact unavailable at the time of
the prior state decision that provides an objective foundation for
the belief that state courts would change their position if they
revisited the issue in dispute. An example would be a new statute
right on-point, or a subsequent state supreme court decision in a
closely related area that adopts a new approach and indicates that
existing on-point precedent would be reversed.
Down on the bayou in Louisiana, however, something funny
has happened to Erie in its application to decisions made by
Louisiana's intermediate courts. Erie has been submerged beneath
a flood tide of federal courts exulting over Louisiana's civilian law
tradition, yet refusing to accept Louisiana precedent. Forty years
ago, Judge John Minor Wisdom, one of the Fifth Circuit's most
respected members and a lawyer from an old New Orleans family,
used Louisiana's civil law method of interpretation in his 1964
opinion, Shelp v. National Surety Company,5 as a rationale for
reaching his own decision on Louisiana state law de novo. Judge
Wisdom followed the procedures of a Louisiana state court in
going right to primary sources of Louisiana law in the civilian
manner. He asserted the right of a federal judge deciding
Louisiana law to also look directly at the sources of substantive
state law, even if to do so meant largely ignoring state court
3. Erie was more than just an occasion for Justice Brandeis to provide a
stirring example of opinion writing and a substantive decision of great
importance. It also furnished the fodder for one of the most entertaining law
review dissections of any case. See Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie?, 56
Tex. L. Rev. 1011 (1978).
4. West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 237, 160 S. Ct. 179, 183 (1940).
5. 333 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1964).
6. Id. at 435.
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decisions, at least (and this is a somewhat illogical qualification)
those below the state supreme court level.7 Judge Wisdom viewed
his approach as compelled by Louisiana's civilian tradition.
This special, Louisiana-only discounted Erie rule against
deference to state court precedent was powerfully bolstered a few
decades later by another of the Fifth Circuit's most respected
members, Judge Alvin Rubin. In an influential law review article,
Judge Rubin urged federal courts to adopt civilian methods when
reviewing Louisiana law and, in essence, to ignore, or at least
downplay, the decisions of Louisiana's state courts in the same
area.8
The no-deference rule was hatched from a surfeit of fidelity to
civilian interpretive procedures. Yet this dismissive rule, which
applies only to the lower courts of one state, Louisiana, has had the
opposite effect. Erie declares a rule of institutional deference.
9
Shelp is a rule of institutional disregard. Erie demands that state
courts, not federal courts, interpret state law and that citizens and
non-citizens alike have the same rights under state law, whether
their case is decided in state or federal court. But under Shelp's
no-deference rule, federal courts enjoy license to indulge their
private readings of Louisiana law, and the supposedly abandoned
pre-Erie discriminatory dual system of law symbolized by Swift v.
Tyson has been revived. The rule encourages federal courts to
disagree with Louisiana state judges and to substitute their own
reasoning whenever they think their reading of Louisiana law is
superior. A rule founded on respect for Louisiana's unique
processes has ended up having the opposite effect.
I. ERIE WAS DESIGNED TO END DUAL SYSTEMS OF LAW AND TO
UPHOLD STATE JUDGES' RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN LAW
The facts that gave rise to Erie seemed likely to be of more
interest to the plaintiff, Harry J. Tompkins, than to anyone else.
"[S]omething which looked like a door projecting from one of the
moving cars" on an Erie Railroad Company train hit Tompkins
7. Id. at438-39.
8. Alvin Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in Federal Court: Travel
and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 La. L. Rev. 1369 (1988).
9. See infra part I.B.
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while he was walking along a footpath that bordered the train
tracks in Hughestown, Pennsylvania. When Tompkins sued the
railroad for his injuries, he recovered thirty thousand dollars under
what the trial court and court of appeals treated as a "general" law
of recovery." The railroad argued that it did not owe Tompkins
anything because he was a trespasser, that it had no duty under
Pennsylvania common law and, because Tompkins had been
injured in Pennsylvania, that Pennsylvania's law applied and
created a shield from liability.'
2
Although the Supreme Court began its opinion by citing new,
"more recent research" on the applicable federal statute, section 34
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,13 the most forceful portions
of Erie discuss the "defects, policy and social," that flowed from
Swift v. Tyson's fractious rule.'4  In the Court's view, Swift v.
Tyson created two problems. First, independent federal readings of
state law had given federal judges free rein to re-read state law and
create a discriminatory dual system of law. 15 Second, this federal
intrusion deprecated the abilities of state courts. 1 6 The Supreme
Court therefore reversed and sent the case back for decision under
Pennsylvania precedent.
A. Erie Sought to Avoid a "Discriminatory" Dual System of Law
The graphic problem created by the older system of federal
common law was that non-citizens were petitioning federal courts
to reject unfavorable state rules. Non-citizens thus might receive
extra rights in federal court that they could not expect to get in
state court. In such cases, non-citizens did not necessarily fear the
subjective bias of state courts, the traditional rationale for diversity
jurisdiction.' 7 They sought instead to evade the substantive rules
10. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69, 58 S. Ct. at 818.
11. Id. at 70, 58 S. Ct. at 818.
12. Id. at 71, 58 S. Ct. at 818-19. Not surprisingly, plaintiff Tompkins
disputed Erie's interpretation of Pennsylvania law. See id. at 70, 58 S. Ct. at
818.
13. Id. at 70-72, 58 S. Ct. at 819.
14. Id. at 74, 58 S. Ct. at 820.
15. Id. at 74-76, 58 S. Ct. at 820-21.
16. Id. at 78-80, 58 S. Ct. at 822-23.
17. For thoughts on the traditional argument that the risk of state-court bias
against non-citizens justifies diversity jurisdiction, doubts about the actual
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of law that a state court could be expected to apply evenhandedly
to citizens and non-citizens alike. The problem the non-citizen
sought to avoid was not bias, but the rule of state law itself.
Giving federal courts the power to declare state law rules
"made rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court."' 18 With non-citizens having every incentive to seek
a more favorable opinion in federal court whenever they feared
existing state court decisions, the dual options open to them
"rendered impossible equal protection of the law."' 19 Although the
idea of a federal common law might suggest a striving for national
uniformity, in practice the dual system "Prevented uniformity in
the administration of the law of the state."
2
The Supreme Court surveyed the way that Swift v. Tyson had
spawned improper, differential systems of state law in everything
from commercial law, contracts, and torts to the law of punitive
damages, mineral law, and real estate law. 2 1 The Court might have
been tempted to uphold Swift v. Tyson on stare decisis grounds
because it had been on the books for so long, but Swift v. Tyson's
historic luster paled when constitutional values were at issue. 22
motive and factual support for this view, and the long-running controversy over
this basis for federal court jurisdiction, see Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3601 (2d ed.
1984).
18. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75, 58 S. Ct. at 820. The full citation is even more
emphatic:
Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against
citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten "general law" vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right
should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the
doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.
Id., 58 S. Ct. at 820-21. The Court listed a number of prominent critics of Swift
v. Tyson. Id. at 77 n.20, 58 S. Ct. at 822 n.20. However, the Court admitted that
the old rule had its supporters, too. Id. at 78 n.22, 58 S. Ct. at 822 n.22.
19. Id. at 75, 58 S. Ct. at 820-21.
20. Id. at 78-80, 58 S. Ct. at 822-23.
21. Id. at 75-76, 58 S. Ct. at 821.
22. Id. at 77-78, 58 S. Ct. at 822. "But the unconstitutionality of the course
pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so [to find it
unconstitutional]." Id., 58 S. Ct. at 822.
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B. Erie is a Constitutionally Mandated Rule of Institutional
Deference
The Erie Court found a second, independent problem with
federal judges independently deciding issues of state law. The
Constitution reserves this power to the states.23 The Constitution's
federalist structure imposes a rule of institutional deference.
Nothing in the Constitution gives federal courts power to decide
substantive state law.
24
Justice Brandeis cited two influential decisions to support his
federalist point about the integrity of state court authority over
state law. He cited Justice Stephen J. Field's dissent in Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh25 for the proposition that "the
Constitution of the United States ... recognizes and preserves the
autonomy and independence of the states,--independence in their
legislative and independence in their judicial departments." 26 The
23. Id. at 78-80, 58 S. Ct. at 822-23. "[E]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is
the law of the state. There is no general federal common law." Id., 58 S. Ct. at
822.
24. Id., 58 S. Ct. at 821.
25. 149 U.S. 368, 401, 13 S. Ct. 914, 927 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
26. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79, 58 S. Ct. at 822 (citation omitted). The
Baltimore & Ohio case stemmed from an even more serious train wreck than in
Erie, a collision of two trains in Ohio in which an Ohio locomotive fireman lost
an arm and the use of his leg. 149 U.S. at 369, 13 S. Ct. at 914. The Maryland
"citizen" Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company had been found liable by a jury
properly instructed under Ohio law, but that determination was reversed on
appeal under a supposed federal common law. Id. at 370, 13 S. Ct. at 914-15.
The Supreme Court majority accepted the company view that, applying a
general common law that clearly was not the law in Ohio, an engineer and
fireman were "fellow servants" and that this status precluded the fireman from
recovering against their joint employer, the railroad, for injuries caused by the
engineer's negligence. Id. at 370-90, 13 S. Ct. at 914-23. As a result, the
fireman, John Baugh, had to live with his injuries without compensation.
Justice Field wrote an impassioned dissent based on the independence of the
states and the absence of a separate federal or general law in areas of state
regulation. See id. at 391, 13 S. Ct. at 923 (Field, J., dissenting). He criticized
the "habit" of some "learned judges" in the federal system of relying on a
general "law of the country" and appealed to "the Constitution of the United
States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the
States--independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial
departments." Id. at 401, 13 S. Ct. at 927. Field pinpointed the basic problem as
he decried a system under which "there could be one law when a suitor went
into the state courts and another law when the suitor went into the federal courts,
319
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Baltimore & Ohio opinion had arisen as one of many cases
displaying the mischief of an independent federal reading of state
law. The Court reversed a jury verdict awarding a severely injured
Ohio locomotive fireman nearly seven thousand dollars in money
damages after a devastating accident in which he lost his arm.
27
The Court's ground for reversal was its choice to apply a federal
common law that was much more protective of corporations than
the Ohio law on which the state court jury had been instructed.28
In Erie, Justice Brandeis also cited Justice Holmes's dissent in
Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab:2 9 'The
authority and the only authority is the State, and if that be so, the
voice adopted by the State as its own (whether it be of its
Legislature or of its Supreme Court) should utter the last word. 30
Black and White Taxicab ably illustrated the opportunity for
egregious abuse opened up by Swift v. Tyson. The plaintiff, a
Tennessee corporation established to operate a taxicab business in
Kentucky for a Kentucky railroad, had incorporated in Tennessee
for the purely strategic reason that Kentucky courts would not
enforce an anticompetitive exclusivity agreement with the
railroad. Believing that federal courts might enforce such an
agreement, the plaintiff needed diversity jurisdiction to have a
in relation to a cause of action arising within'the state .... ." Id. at 404, 13 S. Ct.
at 928.
Separately from the dual system's affront to individual rights that was such a
part of Erie, Justice Field listed the threat to federalism:
Nothing can be more disturbing and irritating to the States than an
attempted enforcement upon its people of a supposed unwritten law of
the United States, under the designation of the general law of the
country, to which they have never assented and which has no existence
except in the brain of the Federal judges in their conceptions of what
the law of the States should be on the subjects considered.
Id. at 403, 13 S. Ct. at 927-28. Justice Field urged that federal judges had no
choice but to follow state law, at least when state law "is neither unsettled nor
doubtful, but is established and certain." Id. at 397, 13 S. Ct. at 925.
27. Id. at 369, 13 S. Ct. at 914.
28. In a common pattern for pre-Erie diversity cases, an out-of-state
corporation thus secured immunity from damage for injuring an in-state citizen.
The decision was "in favor of the largest exemptions of corporations from
liability." Id. at 411, 13 S. Ct. at 930.
29. 276 U.S. 518, 48 S. Ct. 404 (1928).
30. Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 79, 58 S. Ct. 817, 823 (1938).
31. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 523-24,48 S. Ct. at 405.
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chance of hiding from Kentucky law behind a federal shield.32 The
plaintiff fabricated the basis for diversity jurisdiction via its out-of-
state incorporation, in an effort to evade the reach of Kentucky
state courts and improve its chances of preserving an agreement to
restrain railroad cab service in Kentucky. The plaintiffs plan, if
permitted, would effectively allow an anticompetetive scheme to
operate in Kentucky that was forbidden by Kentucky law, as
defined by Kentucky courts.
The United States Supreme Court approved the plaintiffs
unsavory wish, but Justice Holmes wrote in dissent with the voice
of history as he insisted that the proper source of law within a state
was the declaration of its own legislature or courts. 33  "The
common law so far as it is enforced in a State . . . is not the
common law generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in
England or anywhere else." 34 A decision of the state's highest
court should be just as binding as a state statute.35
Although Black and White Taxicab did not pertain to
Louisiana, Justice Holmes did note Louisiana's unique legal
characteristics in an aside full of significance for the later special
Louisiana rule. 36 He hinted that even under Swift v. Tyson, the
singularity of Louisiana's civilian tradition might require federal
courts to give more deference to Louisiana's courts, not less, a
conclusion opposite to that of the federal appellate judges who
subsequently have looked at Louisiana state appellate court
decisions as less worthy of respect.37  In Holmes's compelling
logic, the existence of special interpretive rules for a particular
state would be a reason for giving even wider sway to that state's
judges. In a contemplative parenthetical to the Taxicab case,
Holmes wrote that even under the non-deferential Swift v. Tyson
rule, "I do not know whether.., we should regard ourselves as
32. Id.
33. Id. at 532, 48 S. Ct. at 408 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 533-34, 48 S. Ct. at 409.
35. See id. at 534, 48 S. Ct. at 409. As in Erie itself, so in Holmes' dissent
the issue was deference to the highest state court. The problem of intermediate-
court authority had to wait until the United States Supreme Court had decided
the main point, the supremacy of state supreme courts on state law issues.
36. Id. at 533-34, 48 S. Ct. at 409.
37. Id. at 534, 48 S. Ct. at 409.
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authorities upon the general law of Louisiana superior to those
trained in the system."
Because the Constitution imposes federalism as a constitutional
requirement, Erie's institutional deference rises far above the
suggestions of judicial etiquette that can underlie comity. In
rejecting Swift v. Tyson, the Erie opinion noted that assumptions by
federal courts of the power to decide state rules of law "have
invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the
Constitution to the several states." 39  Charles Alan Wright and
Mary Kay Kane accurately summed up the significance of Erie's
justification based on this federalist logic:
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie
decision. It announces no technical doctrine of procedure
or jurisdiction, but goes to the heart of the relations
between the federal government and the states and returns
to the states a power that had for nearly a century been
exercised by the federal government.4
C. Naturally, This Rule of Institutional Deference Requires
Fidelity to Intermediate State Courts, as Well
Erie did not address the proper orbit of intermediate state
courts in the federalist universe. Its resounding language remained
in the context of the deference federal judges must accord to a state
supreme court. 41 Yet, logically, the twin policies behind Erie, its
desire to avoid an unfair, discriminatory dual system of law and the
institutional respect commanded to the competence of state judges
to decide their own law, should apply to intermediate courts just as
much as to a state's highest court. And, indeed, this is what the
Supreme Court decided soon after Erie.
38. Id.
39. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80, 58 S. Ct. 817, 823 (1938).
40. Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Law of Federal Courts 378(6th ed. 2002) (citations omitted).
41. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S. Ct. at 822. "[T]he law to be applied in
any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not
a matter of federal concern." Id., 58 S. Ct. at 822 (emphasis added).
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The issue of the deference due lower state courts quickly
bubbled up to the Court. In West v. AT&T,42 a case begun well
before the Supreme Court decided Erie,43 the Sixth Circuit had
refused to follow an Ohio intermediate court's holding on whether
a formal demand was a prerequisite to accruing a cause of action
for failure to transfer certain stock.44 The Sixth Circuit instead
asserted a general right to "apply what it considered to be the better
rule that demand is unnecessary. . .. "45
Noting that Erie had dealt only with the respect owed to a
state's highest court, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the
"obvious purpose of section 34 of the Judiciary Act," to avoid the
conflicting dual system of law, would be defeated if federal courts
did not have to obey lower-court indicia of state law as well.46
With this predicate, the Supreme Court predictably concluded in
West that federal courts are not free to disregard "rules of decision
commonly accepted and acted upon by the bar and inferior courts
which are nevertheless laws of the state," and that a federal court
could not disregard those rules "even though it thinks the rule is
unsound in principle or that another is preferable." 47 The Court
then announced what has become the general rule for intermediate
decisions:
Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its
considered judgment upon the rule of law which it
announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law which
is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is
42. 311 U.S. 223, 61 S. Ct. 179 (1940).
43. The case on appeal in West first appeared in federal court on July 14,
1937, id. at 234, 61 S. Ct. at 182, over nine months before the Supreme Court
decided Erie. State court litigation between the parties had begun in June 1934,
id. at 232-33, 61 S. Ct. at 181, almost four years before the Erie decision.
44. Id. at 231-35, 61 S. Ct. at 181-82.
45. Id. at 234-35, 61 S. Ct. at 182-83. The accrual issue determined when
the statute of limitations began to run, a dispositive issue in West.
46. Id. at 236, 61 S. Ct. at 183. The Court described section 34's purpose as
to avoid the maintenance within a state of two divergent or conflicting
systems of law, one to be applied in the state courts, the other to be
availed of in the federal courts, only in case of diversity of citizenship.
That object would be thwarted if the federal courts were free to choose
their own rules of decision whenever the highest court of the state has
not spoken.
Id.
47. Id. at 237, 61 S. Ct. at 183.
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convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of
the state would decide otherwise.48
Even though the Ohio Supreme Court might someday override
the Ohio appellate court's decision, nonetheless, "whether that will
ever happen remains a matter of conjecture., 49 In the same month
as it decided West, the Court reversed three other decisions where a




49. Id. at 237-38, 61 S. Ct. at 183-84. Though the West Court noted in
addition that the Ohio Supreme Court had refused to review an appeal from one
phase of the same litigation, this denial of review could not have been
dispositive, as indicated by the Court's notation that the Ohio Supreme Court
could always someday change its mind. Id. at 237, 61 S. Ct. at 183. Writ
denials are relevant evidence of high-court thinking, but not conclusive, because
state supreme courts, like the United States Supreme Court, can always reverse
themselves.
50. In Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 61 S. Ct. 176 (1940),
a same-day decision as West, the federal court refused to follow two decisions
by New Jersey's chancery court on New Jersey trust law. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals had declined to follow the New Jersey decisions because it
concluded that they "[did] not truly express the state law." Id. at 177, 61 S. Ct.
at 178. In reversing, the Supreme Court cited West, and reiterated that even
intermediate decisions need to be respected. Id. at 178-79, 61 S. Ct. at 178-79.
The Court went on to hold that the federal court was "not at liberty to undertake
the determination of that question on its own reasoning independent of the
construction and effect which the State itself accorded to its statute." Id.
In Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District Number 13, 311
U.S. 180, 61 S. Ct. 186 (1940), a decision also handed down on the same day as
West, the district court and Ninth Circuit distinguished a prior, intermediate state
court decision on an issue of liquidated damages under California law that the
Supreme Court found squarely on point. Reversing, the Supreme Court noted
that as there was no other California decision, "[w]e thus have an announcement
of the state law by an intermediate appellate court in California in a ruling which
apparently has not been disapproved, and there is no convincing evidence that
the law of the State is otherwise." Id. at 188, 61 S. Ct. at 188.
In Stoner v. New York Life Insurance Company, 311 U.S. 464, 61 S. Ct. 336
(1940), decided two weeks after West and its siblings, the Supreme Court again
reversed a lower federal court's refusal to follow state law. In Stoner the same
issue, the scope of evidence needed to prove total disability under Missouri law,
had been twice decided by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, with the Missouri
Supreme Court once denying a writ. Id. at 466, 61 S. Ct. at 338. New York Life
then tried to circumvent the state process by filing a federal declaratory
judgment action that the petitioner was not totally disabled. Although the
federal district judge held a trial and found for the petitioner, thus agreeing with
the two prior state decisions, New York Life finally got lucky with the Eighth
Circuit, which reversed. Id. at 467, 61 S. Ct. at 337. The Eighth Circuit decided
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In both West and the same-day Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Field,51 the Court rooted its continued deference to state court
decisions on state law questions, including decisions by
intermediate state courts, in its interpretation that section 34 of the
Judiciary Act sought a single rule of decision, and in the principle
that justice should not vary depending upon whether a non-citizen
ended up in state or federal court. In West, the Court explained
this rationale of Erie as seeking:
... to avoid the maintenance within a state of two divergent
or conflicting systems of law, one to be applied in the state
courts, the other to be availed of in the federal courts, only
in case of diversity of citizenship. That object would be
thwarted if the federal courts were free to choose their own
rules of decision whenever the highest court of the state has
not spoken.
52
In Fidelity Union, the Court spoke in similarly strong terms,
holding it "inadmissible that there should be one rule of state law
for litigants in the state courts and another rule for litigants who
bring the same question before the federal courts owing to the
circumstance of diversity of citizenship."
53
The extension of Erie to lower courts does have some limits.
Even in early cases like West, there were hints that the state court
determination must have some indicia that it is a valid reading of
state law. For instance, a lower court had to have at least minimal
stature within the state judicial system before federal judges would
to blaze its own path into Missouri law. When the Supreme Court reversed, it
found the precise question already decided, and no "convincing evidence" nor
even "any indication that the Kansas City Court of Appeals or the Missouri
Supreme Court would decide the case differently." Id. at 467-68, 61 S. Ct. at
338.
The Court had suggested that federal judges should follow intermediate state
decisions even earlier, almost a year before it decided West. In Russell v. Todd,
the Court held that "[i]n the absence of a definitive ruling by the highest court of
the state, we accept the decision of the Appellate Division and the reasoning of
the Court of Appeals upon which it rests as persuasive." 309 U.S. 280, 293, 60
S. Ct. 527, 534 (1940).
51. 311 U.S. 169, 61 S. Ct. 176 (1940).
52. West, 311 U.S. at 236, 61 S. Ct. at 183.
53. Fidelity Union, 311 U.S. at 180, 61 S. Ct. at 179.
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be bound to follow it.54 A decade after Erie, in King v. Order of
United Commercial Travelers,55 the Court approved a federal
judge's direct reading of an insurance policy under South Carolina
law even though a South Carolina court of common pleas had
issued a contrary but unreported decision on the same policy for
the same plaintiff, albeit against a different insurer.
5 6
The Supreme Court admitted in King that it had required
fidelity to a trial decision of a New Jersey chancery court in
Fidelity Union, but distinguished that case because the New Jersey
court "had state-wide jurisdiction," received some deference from
New Jersey's Supreme Court, and bound later chancery cases
through its decisions. 57 In contrast, the South Carolina trial court
did not command similar respect because, as a court of common
pleas, its opinions were not published or digested, "seem to be
accorded little weight as precedents in South Carolina's own
courts," and therefore did not "have such importance and
competence within South Carolina's own judicial system that its
decisions should be taken as authoritative expositions of that
State's laws." 58 Because the South Carolina trial court decision
could "apparently be ignored" by all other South Carolina courts,
54. In West, the Supreme Court discussed lower court decisions "which are
nevertheless laws of the state," and law "authoritatively declared." 311 U.S. at
236, 238, 61 S. Ct. 183-84. In Fidelity Union, the Court mentioned that the
decisions by the Court of Chancery whose opinions it held must be followed "if
they have not been disapproved, are treated as binding in later cases in
chancery." 311 U.S. at 179, 61 S. Ct. at 179 (citation omitted). The Court
suggested that "a uniform ruling either by the Court of Chancery or by the
Supreme Court over a course of years will not be set aside by the highest court
'except for cogent and important reasons."' Id., 61 S. Ct. at 179 (quoting
Ramsey v. Hutchinson, 187 A. 650, 651 (N.J. 1936)). This is a somewhat
careless and implicit reservation of an unidentified federal power to gauge
whether even a state supreme court decision was still in place as good law.
55. 333 U.S. 153, 68 S. Ct. 488 (1948).
56. See id. at 155-56, 68 S. Ct. at 489-90 for the procedural context.
57. Id. at 159, 68 S. Ct. at 491-92. The Supreme Court carefully limited
King to its facts, and equally carefully went out of its way to make clear that it
was not saying federal courts never have to "abide" by state trial-court
decisions. Id. at 162, 68 S. Ct. at 493.
58. Id. at 160-61, 68 S. Ct. at 492-93. One reason the Supreme Court
found deference implausible was that it was hard to even locate decisions by
South Carolina's courts of common pleas, which were only filed in the county
where a case was tried. Id. at 161-62, 68 S. Ct. at 492-93. "Litigants could find
all the decisions on any given subject only by laboriously searching the
judgment rolls in all of South Carolina's forty-six counties." Id. at 161, 68 S.
Ct. at 493.
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"it would be incongruous indeed to hold the federal court bound by
a decision which would not be binding on any state court."
5 9
The suggestion that federal courts should gauge the weight of
state court decisions, at least beyond a minimal scrutiny (weeding
out courts that no one within the system takes seriously and that no
one thinks establish the law, which may be what the Supreme
Court thought about these South Carolina trial courts), 6° will
always recreate the Erie problem. Non-citizens will have a new
shot at differential treatment by seeking out federal judges, and
state systems will be exposed anew to institutional rejection by
their federal counterparts.
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, Inc.,6 l the
Supreme Court made additional suggestions on the type of
subterranean change in state law that, short of direct action by a
state's highest court, might "undermine" intermediate state
decisions. Noting that a Vermont law made arbitration agreements
revocable until an award was made, and finding that the federal
arbitration statute did not apply, the Court included as reasons why
it would follow existing Vermont law that "there is no later
authority from the Vermont courts, that no fracture in the rules
announced in those cases has appeared in subsequent rulings or
dicta, and that no legislative movement is under way in Vermont to
change the result of those cases. ' 62  This casual language itself
59. Id. at 161, 68 S. Ct. at 493.
60. Yet note the caveat in King that decisions of South Carolina's court of
common pleas were "accorded little weight," not none, but little. Id. at 160, 68
S. Ct. at 492 (emphasis added). Unless the Supreme Court actually meant that
these nondescript trial courts in fact were accorded no weight, it is hard to think
that the spirit of Erie allows federal courts to determine just how seriously a
state takes its own courts and then adjust its deference accordingly. Were that
the case, what about state appellate decisions that are not precedent in other
areas of the state? Should a federal court defer only if it happens to sit in the
same geographic area? What if intermediate courts do not have any rule of
heeding other panel's decisions, but only that of their supreme court? No matter
how heavy or light the deference to a state court within its own system, failing to
honor the state courts will always risk creating a dual system that puts federal
and state judges at loggerheads, and will always encourage federal disrespect for
state judges.
61. 350 U.S. 198, 76 S. Ct. 273 (1956).
62. Id. at 204, 76 S. Ct. at 277. A few sentences later the Court added in
equally vague language that "there appears to be no confusion in the Vermont
decisions, no developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the
established ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont
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shows the danger of dicta---dicta are not enough to overturn a rule
of law and should not vary the level of deference, and a
"legislative movement" could not be cited as law in any state
unless it converts its efforts into actual, passed legislation.
Despite these potential limitations, the general rule of
deference to even intermediate state courts nonetheless remains,
and can apply with great stringency. For instance, in McMahon v.
Toto, a 2002 opinion, the Eleventh Circuit reversed one of its own
very recent decisions, on whether Florida would apply its offer-of-
judgment statute in a case tried in Florida but applying another
state's law, because a Florida intermediate state court issued a
contrary ruling soon after the prior Eleventh Circuit decision. 63
The Eleventh Circuit initially had concluded, in the absence of any
dispositive Florida decision, that Florida would not apply its offer-
of-judgment statute to disputes in its own courts that turned on
other states' laws.64  But an intermediate Florida state court
judges on the question, no legislative development that promises to undermine
the judicial rule." Id. at 205, 76 S. Ct. at 277. The Court took particular comfort
from the fact that the federal judge deferring to the State was a Vermont judge,
so "we give special weight to his statement of what the Vermont law is." Id. at
204, 76 S. Ct. at 277 (citations omitted).
In actuality, if Erie let any federal judge be less deferential to state court
decisions--and Erie does not allow such selective obedience, except,
unfortunately, in Louisiana where federal judges have presumed the right to
disregard state courts under the special Erie exception--the less-deferential
federal judges should be those who sit in the state whose law is at issue. These
judges tend to have practiced in their state, are more likely to have been on a
state court or to interact frequently with the state's judges, and thus are likely to
be closer to the state's law than other federal judges. They would be more
distant on average than state judges themselves, but closer than other federal
judges sitting in outside states. If they did reject a state rule, there would be at
least some chance that they would ruffle fewer feathers than an unknown judge
living in a distant state.
63. 311 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 914, 123 S. Ct.
2273 (2003).
64. Id. at 1079-80. Under Florida law, defendants in civil actions who file
an offer of judgment are entitled to recover "reasonable costs and attorneys fees"
under certain circumstances. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.79 (1997). The McMahon
defendant offered judgment for one hundred dollars, an amount the Eleventh
Circuit later determined included attorneys fees and punitive damages. 311 F.3d
at 1081-83. The defendant won, and the trial court awarded $260,034.29 in
costs and fees because the plaintiff, who received nothing, did worse than the
one-hundred-dollar offer. Id. at 1084. When the plaintiff tried to come under
one of the offer-of-judgment statute's exclusions by arguing that the offer was
not made in good faith, and claiming that the defendant "lacked any reasonable
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promptly rejected this Eleventh Circuit rule. Faced with a new,
contrary intermediate state decision, fidelity to Erie led the
Eleventh Circuit to abandon its own just-decided principle in
McMahon. As it noted, had the Florida intermediate opinion been
available earlier, "we would have followed it."' 65 Indeed, absent
West-like "other persuasive data" suggesting the Florida Supreme
Court would disagree, the Eleventh Circuit would have been
"compelled" to follow the state rule.66 In sum, then, the Eleventh
Circuit properly (in an Erie sense) overturned its recent decision
because, no matter how well-reasoned its own analysis had been,
Florida appellate judges "presumably know more about Florida
law than we do."
6 7
Under Erie, state courts indeed are taken to know their own
law better. The issue is not a subjective one of actual knowledge
or sophistication, but one rather of institutional competence and
entitlement. State courts are designated to make decisions about
their own state law. The goal is to avoid a separate federal system
of state law. As Wright, Miller, and Cooper wrote years ago, the
federal court's "function when divining the content of forum state
law is not to choose the rule of law that it believes is 'better.',
68
Unfortunately, many Fifth Circuit panels addressing Louisiana law
have had a different, much less respectful approach to Louisiana's
intermediate state courts.
II. ERIE'S EROSION BY THE NO-DEFERENCE RULE FOR LOUISIANA
The erosion of Erie in relation to intermediate Louisiana state
court decisions began in a grim case. In Shelp v. National Surety
Company,69 a New Orleans lessee and her guest, both assaulted
basis for believing that he would prevail," the court not surprisingly pointed to
the "inconvenient fact" that the defendant did prevail. Id. at 1083. To find there
was no reasonable basis to think a prevailing party could have prevailed "would
require self-contradiction on a scale that we are unwilling to consider." Id. at
1083-84.
65. Id. at 1080.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note
17, § 4507, at 150-51.
69. 333 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1964).
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and one raped after an intruder broke through their defective front
door in a French Quarter apartment, sued the building owner's
insurance company. Recovery from the insurer turned on whether
a Louisiana statute, Civil Code article 2716, which excluded from
a landlord's general liability the parts of premises that were the
tenant's responsibility to repair or within the tenant's sphere of
control, included doors.70  The article clearly made lessees, not
landlords, responsible for windows, locks, and hinges, but it did
not mention doors, even though a much earlier French version of
the Louisiana Civil Code had done so.7 1
The plaintiffs had a very simple and compelling plain-meaning
argument. The French version of the relevant article in the
Louisiana Code of 1825 expressly allocated responsibility for
doors to the lessee, but the same article in the English Code of
1825, later incorporated into the controlling Revised Civil Code of
,,721870, dropped the term "doors. Understandably, the plaintiffs
argued that "a court is bound by the plain wording of the law:
where there is no ambiguity in the language of an article courts
cannot change its meaning by resorting to the French text of the
Code of 1825. ' '7 It is hard to think of how one could pay better
homage to statutory language than to honor a change that dropped
"doors" from the lessee's areas of responsibility.
Even better, from the plaintiffs' perspective, they had in their
favor what Judge Wisdom viewed as the one extant "all-fours case
... the only Louisiana decision squarely on-point." 74 In Bradley v.
Yancy, 75 a case from 1939, Louisiana's Second Circuit Court of
70. Id. at 432.
71. Id. at 432-33.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 433, 438-39.
75. 195 So. 110, 112-14 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). In Bradley, the Louisiana
Second Circuit Court of Appeal squarely addressed the omission of "doors"
from the Louisiana Code. It was aware that "portes" was in the French version
of the Code of 1825, but not in the English version, and not in the succeeding
Revised Civil Code of 1870. See id. at 112. The court noted that the Code of
1870 was printed only in English; that this later code was an amendment as well
as a re-enactment; that the court had to apply unambiguous law as written; and
that the Civil Code of 1870 contained "many articles" not in the Code of 1825
and "fails to include many articles which were in the Code of 1825." Id. at 113.
Thus the Second Circuit considered and rejected the idea that a Louisiana court
could ignore the plain meaning of the absence of "doors" in the governing
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Appeals found that a lessee is not responsible for doors because
doors are not listed in revised article 2716. Thus an intermediate
state court already had decided the Shelp issue for the tenants.
Under the ordinary reading of Erie, that should have been the end
of the inquiry.
Without squarely addressing what it meant for Erie, Judge
Wisdom ultimately disregarded Bradley in deciding Shelp. He
began with the proposition that a federal court making its Erie
"guess" should look at Louisiana law differently than at any other
state's laws.76 In deciding an issue of Louisiana law, he argued,
"[t]he Code, doctrinally, constitutes the whole body of private law"
and "we must never forget that it is a Code we are expounding."
77
Judge Wisdom then offered his own theory: the French version of
the 1825 Code article included "doors" among the lessee's
responsibilities even though the English translation did not do so,
and the French version traditionally had been viewed as the
78authoritative law. Further, the governing Code of 1870 intended
to copy the Code of 1825 except for unrelated changes relating to
slavery and supplementation by new articles enacted since 1825. 79
Bradley had rejected the view, espoused in Shelp by Judge
Wisdom, that the Code of 1870 was drafted to be a near carbon
copy of the Code of 1825.80 The Bradley court concluded that
such a position would not only transform every attempt at
interpretation of the later Code into a detailed excursion into the
former, thus multiplying the complexity of Code analysis, but it
would also ignore the fact that the 1870 Code "contains many
articles which were not included in the Code of 1825, and fails to
Louisiana statute. The holding could not have been more directly opposite
Judge Wisdom's in Shelp:
We are convinced that the rule for construction of the articles of the
Code of 1825, in so far as relying on the French text of that code is
concerned, is not applicable to the Revised Civil Code of 1870. If the
article of the Revised Civil Code is not what was intended, it can be
amended, as it was enacted by the Legislature.
Id.
76. Shelp, 333 F.2d at 435.
77. Id. at 435-36.
78. Id. at 436-38.
79. Id.
80. Bradley, 195 So. at 112-13.
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include many articles which were in the Code of 1825."81 The
Bradley court did not feel free to disregard such obvious
differences between the earlier and later Codes, differences that
normally would be respected as plain, unambiguous indications of
legislative intent.8 2  Judge Wisdom nonetheless rejected the
Bradley court's reading of the Code on precisely the same issue.
Under his reading, the omission of "doors" in the English version
of the Code of 1825 was just a translation error which had been
carried over to the Code of 1870 and thereafter. 83 Finding no other
reason to credit the omission when "doors" had stayed in the
French Code of 1825, he held that the current article 2716, which
followed the 1870 Code, "must yield" to its predecessor in the
earlier French Code.
84
To deal with Erie, which he accused the plaintiffs of
"clutching," Judge Wisdom classified Bradley v. Yancy and its
natural, plain-meaning reading as "a single, aberrant deviation"
from other past cases that found the French text of the 1825 Code
binding. 85  Yet none of those other cases addressed the factual
issue in dispute in Shelp, a landlord's potential liability for
maintaining the security of doors. Although Judge Wisdom cited
cases dealing with differences between the French and English
Codes of 1825 and the incorporation of these differences in later
law, none of those cases dealt directly with the substantive issue in
Shelp.86 The second circuit's decision in Bradley v. Yancy
certainly did.
81. Id. at 113.
82. As the Bradley court pointed out, the legislature's reasons for omitting
the word "door" from the 1870 Code "are not for us to know," and it "was not
necessary for the lawmakers to provide in the article that they had deleted
'doors' in order to express their intention. It is enough that doors were not
included." Id. at 113.
83. Shelp, 333 F.2d at 438.
84. Id. at 439.
85. Id. at 438-39.
86. Judge Wisdom cited a series of cases and authorities on the supremacy
of the French version of the Code of 1825, including cases decided long after the
Code of 1870 was adopted (and so recognizing the continued supremacy of the
earlier French Code in its later incarnation). See id. at 438; see infra note 91 and
accompanying text. As noted below, these other cases offered an alternative
basis for claiming a conflict among state law, and then deciding the case his way
in full fidelity to Erie without announcing the new principle that federal courts
can disregard intermediate Louisiana appellate decisions.
332 [Vol. 66
2006] NO-DEFERENCE ERIE RULE FOR LOUISIANA
Had Judge Wisdom been willing to be bound by state law as
required under Erie and the West line of cases, even if he felt his
state counterpart had been in error and that he had a better reading
of the law, he would have followed Bradley v. Yancy. The average
Erie court would have done so and held the landlord liable for
injuries from the defective door because article 2716 did not list
doors as among the tenant's responsibilities. Indeed, as if to
underline Judge Wisdom's refusal to honor Louisiana law as
decided by its own judges, a Louisiana court of appeals just six
years later followed Bradley in holding that the landlords were
responsible for doors because "[c]riticism [citing Shelp]
notwithstanding, it has not been overruled and the reasoning of the
opinion is sound., 87 Judge Wisdom obviously did not agree with
the soundness of Bradley's reasoning, but he still was bound to
accept that Bradley was not overruled and to follow it because that
is what Erie commands.
Judge Wisdom justified his disregard of state precedent by
arguing that, in Louisiana, "the Erie obligation is to the Code, the
'solemn expression of legislative will.' ' 88  He assumed the
freedom as a federal judge to uncover Louisiana's statutory
purposes independently of the past views of state judges, at least
intermediate Louisiana judges.89 Not discussing the Erie problems
raised by substituting his reading for the intermediate state court's,
Judge Wisdom thus launched, almost backhandedly, the principle
that federal courts reviewing Louisiana law, unlike federal courts
reviewing any other state's law, can make their own interpretation
even in disregard of contrary state appellate decisions.
90
87. McHenry v. Hanover Insurance Co., 246 So.2d 374, 377 (La. Ct. App.
1970).
88. Shelp, 333 F.2d at 439. Judge Wisdom was also on the panel, although
not the author, of the next major nondeferential Erie case, Green v. Walker, 910
F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1990), and in Delaune v. United States, 143 F.3d 995 (5th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072, 119 S. Ct. 805 (1999). See infra notes 95-
103 and accompanying text and infra note 174.
89. Shelp, 333 F. 2d at 439.
90. Judge Wisdom might have tried to pronounce his legislative review to
be the "other persuasive data" that justified disregarding the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeals--that here was an objective basis for believing that the
Louisiana Supreme Court would come out differently than Bradley. But he
could hardly argue that his historical analysis of the priority given to the French
Act of 1825 was a "new" fact or changed circumstance that would have
produced a different outcome in Bradley v. Yancy, when that court rejected the
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It is one of the unfortunate aspects of Shelp that Judge Wisdom
had an easy way to reach the same outcome against the plaintiff-
tenants without advocating a special federal right to disregard
Louisiana's intermediate appellate decisions. He portrayed the
record as having only one prior state case on-point, Bradley. Yet
while Bradley was the only case addressing the substantive issue of
whether "doors" remained within the tenant's responsibilities
under the Code of 1870, its procedural insistence that the 1870
Code should be read without looking back to the Code of 1825 had
been rejected by earlier Louisiana Supreme Court decisions, even
if in cases addressing unrelated substantive issues. 91 This surely
was sufficient conflict in past precedent to question whether
Bradley was good enough law that the Louisiana Supreme Court
would follow it on the Shelp issue.
The other most influential authority in spawning the no-
deference Erie rule for Louisiana is not a case, but a 1988 article in
the Louisiana Law Review. The author was Judge Alvin Rubin,
the article, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in Federal Court:
Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad.92 Judge Rubin penned a
somewhat despairing look at the prospects for civilian lawyers
operating in the federal courts. His bottom line, one somewhat
ironic for an article that has helped persuade federal courts to
expand the special Louisiana exception to Erie, was that the
chances for civilian adjudication surviving in federal court were
slim.93 Subsequent federal courts have cited Rubin's discussion of
precise position he adopted, id. at 437. This conflict may be why Judge Wisdom
stressed instead his claim of special power to ignore intermediate state authority
when reading Louisiana law.
91. See, e.g., Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886); Straus v. City of
New Orleans, 118 So. 125 (La. 1928); Sample v. Whitaker, 135 So. 38 (La.
1931).
92. 48 La. L. Rev. 1369 (1988).
93. Judge Rubin's pessimistic assessment that federal courts were likely to
ignore civilian principles led him to urge that "the lawyer who wishes the case
tried by civilian principles should shun diversity jurisdiction. The only way to
avoid being dragged unwillingly onto the treacherous common law railroad is to
join in a movement for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 1380.
Rubin's pessimism stemmed in part from his sense that federal judges used to
an independent role would have a hard time accepting the submission to
legislative will required of civilians; that briefs in federal court invariably use
case citations pulled from the Westlaw and Lexis databases; and that even many
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Louisiana's civilian tradition as justification for giving Louisiana
intermediate decisions less deference than they would accord other
states' intermediate courts.
94
A more recent case showing the license that the Shelp approach
has granted federal courts to disregard state law is Green v.
Walker,95 a 1990 Fifth Circuit opinion. The issue was whether a
physician hired in Louisiana to do company physicals incurred any
liability when he failed to diagnose an employee's lung cancer. A
recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, Ducote v. Albert,96 had held
that Louisiana workers compensation law did not immunize from
liability a company doctor who had been treating an employee for
a hand injury. Ducote unmistakably described a company doctor's
relationship with patients as a traditional doctor-patient
Louisiana cases involve statutes, not the Code, which he said federal judges
interpret using common-law statutory interpretive principles. Id. at 1377-78.
Judge Rubin claimed that only twenty-three percent of reported federal cases on
Louisiana law in 1986-1987 cited a Code provision; and that in a sample of
Louisiana state appellate decisions for those two years, only thirty-seven percent
mentioned a Code article. Id. at 1378. He interpreted these low percentages as
signs of the rapid spread of common-law adjudication over the retreating waters
of Louisiana's civilian tradition.
94. See, e.g., In re Orso, 283 F.3d 686, 695 & n.29 (5th Cir. 2002); Prytania
Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indemnity Co., 179 F.3d 169, 175 & n.9 (5th
Cir. 1999); Songbyrd v. Bearsville Records, Inc., 104 F.3d 773, 776 & n.7 (5th
Cir. 1997).
Among the differences between common-law adjudication and traditional
civilian analysis is in fact that, as Rubin noted, stare decisis does not bind a civil
judge and that "each judge, trial and appellate, may consult the civil code and
draw anew from its principles." 48 La. L. Rev. at 1372. In addition, he claimed
that a Louisiana trial court's fact findings are diminished because reviewing
courts can assess the facts in a way unknown to the common law. Id.
In a later article that would have been as influential, had Judge Rubin's article
not preceded his, Judge Dennis contrasted the civilian and common-law uses of
precedent. He argued that Louisiana's system of judicial elections, which
produces judges with "strong personalities," tends to yield jurists who fit the
common-law model of the judge as lawmaker rather than the civilian model of
judges bound by legislative will. James Dennis, Interpretation and Application
of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 La. L. Rev. 1, 1
(1994). Judge Dennis described the basic contrast as follows: precedent has a
"leading role" in the common law, while in the civilian tradition it "plays only a
supporting role. The Civil Code is the primary source of law .... ." Id. at 3; see
also id. 14-15 (discussing ways in which Judge Dennis found the common-law
case method "incompatible" with the civilian tradition).
95. 910 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1990).
96. 521 So. 2d 399 (La. 1988).
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relationship, in terms not limited to the special situation of workers
compensation. 97  Thus, when deciding Green, the Fifth Circuit
could have relied on Ducote, a decision of Louisiana's highest
court, and resolved the issue by finding no immunity.
But the Green panel did not read Ducote as controlling.
Instead, the court suggested that Ducote might have been limited
by its workers compensation setting (the immediate issue having
been whether Louisiana's workers compensation statute created a
company immunity that extended to the physician), and turned to a
case from Louisiana's third circuit, Thomas v. Kenton,98 which
held that company doctors conducting routine annual physical
examinations did not have a physician-patient relationship with
employees and so were not liable for malpractice. 99 The Green
panel decided that Thomas v. Kenton, not Ducote, was "arguably...
on all fours with the case at bar.'1°°
Because the Fifth Circuit did not read the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decision in Ducote as governing in Green, it could not treat
Ducote, with its strong language about the doctor-patient
97. In Ducote, the narrow issue was whether the company doctor, whom the
plaintiff had seen to treat an on-the-job hand injury, was immunized under
Louisiana's workers compensation statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the doctor was not shielded because he was working in a "dual capacity," as
a company employee but also within a doctor-patient relationship. The court
followed and discussed at length authority from other jurisdictions holding that a
company doctor's role was "identical to that of a doctor in private practice with
a patient." Id. at 401. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the idea that a
doctor's employment arrangements might confer immunity for malpractice,
particularly when the employer could not control the doctor's professional
activities. Id. at 403--04. The opinion included language inconsistent with the
idea that company doctors would be immune from malpractice liability:
"[W]hen the doctor.., treats a patient he treats the patient as a doctor. Vis-A-
vis his patients he is a doctor, not a co-employee." Id. at 404.
98. 425 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). Ducote and the third circuit's
earlier decision in Thomas can be distinguished in theory on the grounds that in
Ducote the doctor committed malpractice in treating the specific condition for
which he was consulted. 521 So. 2d at 400. In Thomas, the doctor missed a
specific condition but was only consulted for a general check-up. Green, 910
F.2d at 293. Yet such distinctions would be flatly contrary to the Louisiana
Supreme Court's reliance on the basic nature of the doctor-patient relationship
in Ducote. In that light, the Fifth Circuit seems to have reached the right result,
but for a much too indirect reason. It should have read the suggestions in
Thomas that a company doctor might have immunity never available to private
doctors as overruled by Ducote.
99. Thomas, 425 So. 2d at 399-400.
100. Green, 910 F.2d at 293.
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relationship, as having overruled Thomas v. Kenton. The resulting
Erie question is whether the Fifth Circuit resolved the conflict with
appropriate deference, given its reading of the state cases. On that
score, the court wielded Shelp to justify disregarding the
intermediate case that it believed was so much more on-point than
Ducote.
Having framed the issue as whether it had to follow Thomas v.
Kenton, the Green panel used Shelp to avoid that precedent. It
cited Shelp for the principle that Erie "does not command blind
allegiance to [any] case on all fours with the case before the court,"
and, moreover, that this "flexibility is even greater" when
analyzing the law in Louisiana, a state where caselaw is only
"secondary information."101 With this dispensation, the panel
apparently felt safe to disregard Thomas v. Kenton, and never cited
it again. Instead, the panel turned to much more remote
authorities, a general Louisiana statute on tort responsibility (one
not dealing just with physician liability) and a Louisiana Supreme
Court decision that held physicians to a broad professional
responsibility to an unborn child (a politically charged issue that is
certainly not much authority on a company physician's liability). 10
2
On this thin and indirect foundation, the Green court decided that
under Louisiana law, a company medical examination did indeed
create a physician-patient relationship "at least to the extent of the
tests conducted. '
' 1 3
101. Id. at 294.
102. The broad Louisiana statute on the duty of care, article 2315 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, read that "Every act whatever of man that causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Id. at 294 (citing
La. Civ. Code. art. 2315 (1997)). The Louisiana Supreme Court case, Pitre v.
Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988), arose over the failure
of a physician's tubal ligation surgery and the subsequent birth of an albino
child. In holding that the doctor had a duty not only to the parents but also to
the unborn child, the court extended the physician's duty to the child, while
using strong language that the special position and knowledge enjoyed by
physicians should give them a corresponding responsibility. Id. at 1157. The
Green court also cited the statutory duty imposed on Louisiana physicians to
perform with "the degree of care ordinarily exercised by physicians in active
practice in a similar community under similar circumstances" under La. R.S.
9:2794(A)(1) (1997). 910 F.2d at 295.
103. Id. at 295-96.
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In FDIC v. Abraham,1°4 the Fifth Circuit not only used the
special Louisiana rule to disregard an intermediate appellate
decision but, if its decision can be taken at face value, it leveraged
this anti-Erie disregard to bolster a more general justification for
disregarding intermediate state courts in any jurisdiction. In
Abraham, fifteen former officers and directors of a savings bank
allegedly breached their fiduciary duty. The issue was whether
Louisiana's relatively short prescription period for unintentional
torts, instead of its longer period for breach of fiduciary duty,
governed the case.105 The trial court had granted summary
judgment for the defendants based on a one-year statute for
unintentional torts; the FDIC argued on appeal to the Fifth Circuit
that the longer fiduciary breach statute should be applied.
A prior Fifth Circuit panel had held that gross negligence by
corporate directors did not rise to the level of a breach of fiduciary
duty under Louisiana law unless coupled with "fraud, a breach of
trust or other ill acts."'1 6  Louisiana's First Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, held shortly thereafter in Theriot v. Bourg107
that corporate officers and directors could be liable for breach of
fiduciary duty without a gross negligence finding. 108  The
Louisiana Supreme Court, though clearly aware of the Fifth
Circuit's contrary position because it had been cited in the briefs,
denied the writ in Theriot.1°9 Thus Louisiana courts rejected the
Fifth Circuit's conservative effort to narrow application of
Louisiana's fiduciary law and refused to require fraud or other
intentional conduct before exposing officers and directors to
fiduciary-duty claims.
104. 137 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1998).
105. Id. at 266, 268.
106. Id. at 266-67 (citing FDIC v. Barton, 96 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1996)).
107. 96-0466 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/14/97), 691 So. 2d 213, writ denied, 97-
1151 (La. 06/30/97), 696 So. 2d 1008.
108. See id. at 220-22; Abraham, 137 F.3d at 267 (discussing Theriot). In
Theriot, although it did not address prescription, the First Circuit rejected the
argument that a director's breach of fiduciary duty claim required gross
negligence. 691 So. 2d at 221-22. It also specifically rejected another Fifth
Circuit decision, Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Insurance Company,
864 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989), that had accepted the Fifth Circuit's protective
view of corporate liability that required gross negligence. See Theriot, 691 So.
2d at 222.
109. Abraham, 137 F.3d at 267.
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Against this background, the Abraham panel, apparently
seeking a way to ignore Theriot, tried to minimize the conflict
between its past decisions calling for a heightened burden of proof
and Theriot's mere negligence standard in two ways. First, it
noted that a 1992 Louisiana statute provided separate prescription
periods for negligent and for intentional violations by bank officers
and directors." l Yet the court conspicuously did not claim that
this statute governed the dispute before it (were that the case, the
opinion could have ended with that one short point); and another
Fifth Circuit opinion had already held that Louisiana's statute,
although purporting to be retroactive, could not apply retroactively
to cases where the RTC had been appointed a receiver prior to the
1992 statute.11' This exclusion surely rendered the new statute's
prescription periods inapplicable to Abraham.112
Second, the panel noted that its past decision denying that
gross negligence could sustain a breach of fiduciary duty claim had
dealt specifically with limitations, the issue in FDIC v. Abraham;
in contrast, the contrary and more recent intermediate state court
decision in Theriot found that mere negligence could sustain a
fiduciary violation in a dispute over corporate officers' substantive
duty of care, but did not address the statute of limitations. 113 Yet
the limitations portion of the prior Fifth Circuit decision turned
entirely on a substantive view that even grossly negligent directors
did not breach their fiduciary duty under Louisiana law unless the
plaintiff could show "fraud, a breach of trust or other ill acts."'1 14
Theriot thus conflicted directly and irreconcilably with that
holding.
The Abraham opinion bore telltale signs that the panel
understood it was rejecting an existing state rule. Its rendition of
110. Id. at 268 (citing La. R.S. 6:293 (2005) and La. R.S. 6:787 (2005)).
111. See FDIC v. Barton, 96 F.3d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1996).
112. In Barton, the RTC was appointed as receiver eight months before
Louisiana passed its new bank prescription statute, and had filed suit in October
1994. See id. at 131-32. The RTC filed the Abraham complaint in June 1993,
sixteen months before the Barton complaint. Abraham, 137 F.3d at 266. So the
Louisiana statute surely was just as inapplicable to Abraham as it was to Barton.
And if the statute did not apply, the Fifth Circuit should not have been able to
import it indirectly via an implicit use of the statute as evidence on Louisiana
law.
113. Abraham, 137 F.3d at 269-70.
114. Barton, 96 F.3d at 133-34.
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Erie for Louisiana stressed that intermediate decisions were merely
to "guide" a federal court.' 15 It dismissively added that "if we are
chary to rely on--much less be bound by--the holding of one
intermediate state appellate court"' 116 (the exact evidence that Erie
intends federal courts "rely on"), it was doubly chary when
Louisiana law was at stake, where "the primary sources of law are
its constitution, codes, and statutes and the decisions of its courts
are secondary sources of law until and unless the numbers and
unanimity of such decisions achieve the force of law through the
Civil Law doctrine of jurisprudence constante.'" 117
Even then, perhaps uncomfortable that it had disregarded a so-
directly-on-point holding by an intermediate state court, the
Abraham panel retreated behind yet another interpretive doctrine.
It claimed that the prior Fifth Circuit decision bound it, as a later
panel in the same circuit, unless a "subsequent state court
decision" showed that the Fifth Circuit's prior reading of state law
was "clearly wrong." 11 8  The court thus used the historical
coincidence that the state law issue in Abraham had first appeared
in federal court to reverse the presumptively binding Erie nature of
the state court decision, while at the same time elevating the initial
federal reading to a binding decision that would prevail over later
intermediate state decisions unless "clearly wrong."
In this way, a federal decision that turned out to be wrong
under the prism of state law nonetheless was infused with new life,
flipping Erie's burden of review and shifting the presumption back
in favor of the federal system, simply because the federal judge
happened to rule first. Thus, primacy alone lowered the required
federal deference to state court precedent and helped the federal
decision to perpetuate itself. Erie commands deference to state
court jurisprudence; but Abraham holds that if a federal judge gets
there first, subsequent federal courts need not defer to any but the
state's highest court. Finding with angel-on-a-pinhead logic that
the "pure holding" of Theriot was not "clearly contrary" to the
115. Abraham, 137 F.3d at 268 n. 13.
116. Id. at 268.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 269. The prior Fifth Circuit cases were Pruitt v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 936 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1991);
Franham v. Bristow Helicopters, Inc., 776 F.2d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 1985); and
Lee v. Frozen Food Express, Inc., 592 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Fifth Circuit's earlier decision, 19 the panel persuaded itself that it
could disregard the contrary state decision.120
The improper no-deference Louisiana rule thus operated in
Abraham to bolster an equally improper no-deference rule based
solely on the temporal priority of a prior federal panel ruling, one
of the several tragedies of this departure from Erie. As noted, Erie
aims to prevent federal judges from indulging in their own
readings of a given state's law if there is a state determination at
the time of their ruling. Federal judges are not to substitute their
readings, not even if they fervently believe that the state
interpretation is really wrong. (All of this is what deference
means: if federal courts only follow state rules they like, they are
no longer giving state decisions a presumption of correctness.) Yet
under Abraham's past-precedent rule, the Fifth Circuit is free to
confirm a rule contrary to state law just because the issue happens
to have come up first in a federal court, not a state court. This is
the exact opposite of circuits that reverse their own rulings when
state courts have adopted different interpretations."' The fact that
a federal court may have won a first-to-decide competition does
nothing to lessen the twin Erie evils of discriminatory dual systems
of law and institutional deprecation of the state judiciary.
To say that the Fifth Circuit will agree to follow a later state
decision, but only if the pre-existing Fifth Circuit rule is "clearly
wrong," sends a clear invitation to federal courts to invent sophist
distinctions that will sustain their preferred reading of state law
even in the face of contrary intermediate state court holdings.
Worse, this prior-federal-holding presumption can apply to any
level of state court, not just intermediate courts. The same logic
invites federal courts to hairsplit even decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court (or other states) so that the Fifth Circuit can
continue with its own preferred readings of Louisiana law. None
of this institutional disregard has any legitimate foundation in the
fertile soil of Erie jurisprudence.
119. Abraham, 137 F.3d at 269-70.
120. For a very recent affirmation of this first-in-time reason to disregard
Erie, see Lamar Advertising Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 396 F.3d 654, 663
n. 8 (5th Cir. 2005).
121. See, e.g., McMahon v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 914, 123 S. Ct. 2273 (2003). For a discussion of McMahon,
see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Shelp-based incursions into the Erie doctrine continue to be
fruitful and multiply. 122 A recent example occurred in Chevron v.
Vermillion Parish School Board.123  The dispute arose in six
consolidated royalty lawsuits against some of the largest oil
122. Another recent case of Fifth Circuit disregard of Louisiana law based
on the Shelp principle is Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Columbia Gulf
Transmission Co, 290 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2003). The case presented an issue that
has rapidly become critical to Louisiana's economic future, the responsibility for
coastal erosion. Columbia had trespassed on school board property and begun
building a pipeline on it in the mid-1960s. Id. at 308. When the board
discovered the trespass, it entered a servitude agreement with the pipeline. Id.
at 308-09. Columbia allegedly had not properly maintained the canals in the
decades that followed. Id. at 309. The evidence suggested "that breaches in the
canals' banks have exposed the floating marsh to tidal surges, which have
washed away, and continue to wash away, the light organic soil necessary for
the marsh mats to cohere." Id.
The district court granted summary judgment for the pipeline defendants, in
part by applying a general one-year in delicto tort prescription period and not the
ten-year ex contractu period. Id. at 307, 309. The Fifth Circuit found only one
prior intermediate Louisiana decision on what it viewed as the appropriate
prescription period, the period "for a claim of aggravation to the servient estate."
Id. at 317-18. In Stephens v. International Paper Co., 542 So. 2d 35, 38-40
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1989), Louisiana's Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
timber cutters' duty to keep gates closed on a property while cutting timber (to
avoid letting cattle loose), because it "did not arise from a 'special' obligation
contractually assumed," rested only on the general duty to avoid aggravating a
servient estate, instead of the much longer contract period. Id. at 38-40. The
Terrebonne panel based its decision on the same general statutory duty to avoid
aggravating the servient estate. 290 F.3d at 315-17 (citing Stephens, 542 So. 2d
at 39). It nonetheless rejected the short one-year ex delicto prescription period
applied in Stephens and by the Terrebonne trial court. Id. at 318.
The Fifth Circuit did admit it was bound to look to intermediate state
decisions for "guidance," and that such decisions cannot be disregarded without
"other persuasive data." Id. at 317 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, it
speculated-and it was pure speculation-that "[t]he Stephens court, however,
may have misapplied this fundamental principle, and the district court may be
persuaded that if the Louisiana Supreme Court were to consider this issue, it
would adopt the opposite rule." Id. at 318. Terrebonne does not mention the
special Louisiana no-deference rule, but it would have been hard to treat
Stephens more dismissively. The panel remanded to the trial judge to make a
new determination of Louisiana law, under this freer standard. Id.
The Fifth Circuit did suggest that the Louisiana Supreme Court might
distinguish Terrebonne Parish from Stevens because the Terrebonne estate-
holders were not adjoining parties but instead bound by contract over the same
property, but it never explained the relevance of this difference when the
particular obligation did not arise from contract.
123. 128 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. La. 2001), appeal dismissed, 294 F.3d 716
(5th Cir. 2002). As noted at the outset of this article, the author was one of the
counsel for the putative class in this case, which introduced him to the special
Erie rule for Louisiana.
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companies operating in Louisiana, and rested on allegations that
they had underpaid natural gas royalties by not passing on the full
value they or their affiliates received for the gas and by deducting
too many costs from the gas price. The dispositive issue turned out
to be whether Louisiana's Mineral Code, which requires a royalty
owner to give written notice thirty days before suing, allows a class
representative to give notice for an entire class. The only two
intermediate state courts to address the precise issue, both in cases
involving Texaco, had held that class notice is entirely proper, 124 as
had the one prior federal judge to face the issue. 12  The federal
judge even went so far as to quite correctly hold that the contrary
argument, that Louisiana's Mineral Code prohibits class-wide
notice, "contradicts both Louisiana case law and common
sense."' 126 Nothing in the Louisiana Mineral Code prohibits class
notice.
In Vermillion Parish, unfortunately, Louisiana case law did not
prevail, nor did it prevent a Louisiana federal district judge and the
Fifth Circuit from writing a new individual-notice requirement into
the Louisiana Mineral Code. To preface his revision to the Code,
the Vermillion Parish trial judge cited pastiches of past Fifth
Circuit decisions for the proposition that while he was "bound to
apply the law as interpreted by the state's highest court," his job in
the absence of state supreme court adjudication was "to determine,
to the best of [his] ability, how that court would rule if the issue
were before it.' ' 127 Under this very non-deferential standard, the
124. See Lewis v. Texaco, 96-1458 (La. App. 1st Cir. 07/30/97), 698 So. 2d
1001, writ denied, 97-2437 (La. 12/19/97), 706 So. 2d 454; and Duhe v. Texaco,
99-2002 (La. App. 3d Cir. 02/07/01), 779 So. 2d 1070, writ denied, 01-0637
(La. 04/27/01), 791 So. 2d 637. In Lewis, the first circuit rejected Texaco's
argument that the class representatives had to give statutory pre-suit notice for
every class member individually in a gas royalty case involving a huge class of
over 4,200 members in the Hollywood field in Terrebonne Parish. 698 So. 2d at
1008-11. In Duhe, an oil posted-price royalty case, the defendant again was
Texaco. 779 So. 2d 1070. The third circuit followed Lewis and held that
certification was appropriate for a statewide class over approximately 6,000
"active" leases, with approximately 13,000 to 14,000 lessors. Id. at 1087.
125. The federal case in which the class-action notice issue arose was the
national oil posted-price litigation before Judge Jack in federal court in Corpus
Christi, Texas. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II) ("MDL 1206"), 186
F.R.D. 403 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
126. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litigation (No. II), MDL Docket No. 1206,
Order No. 16, at 11 (May 13, 1998).
127. Vermillion Parish, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 967.
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trial judge felt free to "consider all authority relevant to what it
concludes the Louisiana Supreme Court would look to in order to
decide the issue at bar."'12 In other words, the judge would
conduct his own de novo analysis. By virtue of having been
appointed in the federal system, the judge stepped into the shoes of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, the very problem Erie tried to
eradicate.
Assuming the right to make his own analysis, the Vermillion
Parish trial judge then concluded that by using the singular word
"he" in requiring that a lessor "must give his lessee written notice"
in La. R.S. 31:137,129 the Louisiana Legislature must have
intended to forbid class representatives from giving class notice.
Because an oil royalty class representative will generally not even
know the names of the class members unless the court allows
certification discovery, this holding treated the Code as if the
legislature must have intended to bar class actions. Vermillion
Parish's only remaining reference to deference was to observe that
if required to wade into Louisiana intermediate law, the court
would find it conflicting, a position reached by marshalling cases
that were not even class actions as if they present a conflict with
class cases holding class notice proper. 1
30
128. Id.
129. Id. at 967-68.
130. This portion of Vermillion Parish essentially follows the oil company
position in claiming that three cases that did not contain any intermediate court
holdings on class notice nonetheless created a conflict with two cases that did.
The idea that cases with specific holdings approving class notice can be offset
by cases that do not address the issue, including non-class cases, is an example
of conservative judicial activism thwarting the natural operation of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.
The Vermillion Parish trial court held that the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Stoute v. Wagner & Brown, 637 So.2d 1199 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 5/20/94) conflicted with and was better law than the later opinion in Lewis
v. Texaco. 96-1458 (La. App. 1st Cir. 07/30/97), 698 So. 2d 1001, writ denied,
97-2437 (La. 12/19/97), 706 So. 2d 454. Indeed, the court treated Stoute as
dispositive in its statement that "the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit was correct in the Stoute case in its interpretation of the notice
requirement of article 137." Vermillion Parish, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
But Stoute did not contain an appellate holding on class notice, while Lewis
did. As the Vermillion Parish court itself admitted, the only issue on appeal in
Stoute was whether the court properly denied certification. Id. at 966. In Stoute,
at the trial court level, the judge had required individual class notice. 637 So. 2d
at 1200-01. That holding, however, which was not the issue on appeal, was not
dispositive because the Stoute opinion ultimately held that a class action would
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not be a superior method of adjudicating a royalty dispute in a small field in
which an unusual number of class members already had sued individually. Id.
(The Stoute court also repeated the inevitable oil-company line that each lease is
"different," id. at 1201, a trap for unwary judges who may not know that oil-
and-gas leases tend to use standard terms).
In contrast, the same first circuit, in Lewis, squarely addressed and rejected an
oil-company challenge to the availability of class notice under article 137. The
issue had even more prominence in this case because oil industry amici filed
briefs, and the decision was unsuccessfully appealed to the Louisiana Supreme
Court. The Lewis court rejected the attack on class notice. It noted that the
individual-language theory, the theory Vermillion Parish's federal judge later
adopted, makes no sense in a Code whose starting sections define the singular to
include the plural and vice versa. Lewis, 698 So. 2d at 1009.
The Vermillion Parish judge distinguished Lewis because it concerned only a
single field, not the statewide classes before him. Vermillion Parish, 128 F.
Supp. 2d at 968. This distinction could not separate these cases because the
company argument was that the Louisiana Mineral Code requires individual
notice by all class members--not that it allows class representative notice in
single-field classes but not statewide classes. Moreover, as Lewis involved well
over 4,000 royalty owners, a huge class, 698 So. 2d at 1006, it is hard to see why
statewide classes would fall under a different rule. The Vermillion Parish judge
did not suggest any reason to differentiate it from a statewide class.
The fact that Stoute does not represent a holding on article 137 notice issues
can be established conclusively because the same circuit rejected the argument
that Stoute had decided this issue when it later decided Lewis. Lewis did not
adopt the position the Vermillion Parish oil companies claimed had been
adopted in Stoute, but Lewis would have been bound to do so had Stoute been
good law on the class-notice issue since the first circuit follows the law-of-the-
circuit rule. See, e.g., Louisiana Employers-Managed Insurance Co. v.
Litchfield, 01-0123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/01), 805 So. 2d 386, 391.
The Vermillion trial court relied almost as heavily on a second case cited by
the oil companies, Willis v. Franklin, 420 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982),
as though it supported an individual-notice requirement. See Vermillion Parish,
128 F. Supp. 2d at 966, 968. But Willis could hardly decide a class-notice issue,
for it set out to determine an issue of a different nature-whether a party
choosing to proceed by individual litigation but failing to give proper notice can
nonetheless piggyback on the individual notice of another plaintiff. 420 So. 2d
1244-46. The Willis court held that an ordinary individual notice does not
extend to other parties. Id.
The Vermillion Parish opinion noted that the oil-company individual-notice
argument had been rejected in Duhe v. Texaco, No. 86-848 (Parish of Iberia,
16th Judicial Dist.), with the third circuit denying Texaco's writ application in
that case, but made no effort to distinguish Duhe. See Vermillion Parish, 128 F.
Supp. 2d at 967.
Finally, the Vermillion Parish judge cited Rivers v. Sun Exploration and
Production Co., 559 So. 2d 963 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990), as an expression of the
notice requirement's general purpose. Vermillion Parish, 128 F. Supp. 2d at
965. The Rivers issue, however, was readily distinguishable. The Rivers court
merely held that a notice letter complaining about price underpayments could
not be stretched to include a claim for nonpayment, a failure to pay at all, for
certain production. 559 So. 2d at 969-70. As far as a general standard, the
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On appeal, when the Fifth Circuit finally addressed the
substantive issue in Vermillion Parish,13 1 it affirmed and offered
yet another prime example of federal judges imposing their
preferred reading of state law despite existing state decisions.
Following neither of the relevant Louisiana intermediate decisions
and relying instead on the same cases that did not address class
notice as the trial court, the Fifth Circuit claimed a state law
conflict where none existed. 132 Once thus unshackled from its Erie
opinion actually contains liberal language that notice need not be a demand for
performance, but need merely put the lessee on notice. The court stated that
there is no precise or specific requirement for the notice; the lessee just has to
receive enough information so that he can investigate. Id. at 968-69.
On remand from a first appeal, the Vermillion Parish judge again relied on
Stoute and Willis as his primary substantive authority on the class-notice issue.
Chevron v. Vermillion Parish School Bd., 215 F.R.D. 511, 513, 515 n.4 (W.D.
La. 2003), certified to Louisiana Supreme Court, 364 F.3d 607 (5th Cir.),
certified question refused, 872 So. 2d 533, underlying opinion affid, 377 F.3d
459 (5th Cir. 2004).
131. The Fifth Circuit chose not to decide the merits in a first appeal. See
infra note 135. On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment on the
same class-notice grounds on which he had dismissed the case the first time.
Vermillion Parish, 215 F.R.D. 511, 515-16 (W.D. La. 2003) (deciding, in
addition, that Louisiana school boards are not proper parties to bring class
actions, id. at 516-17), and the Fifth Circuit unsuccessfully tried to certify the
question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. See infra note 135.
132. The Fifth Circuit was vague on the exact conflict in Louisiana law, as if
it did not want to directly endorse the trial court's (and oil companies')
proposition that a conflict does exist. In its order certifying the question to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless attempted to suggest a
conflict within Louisiana law to help support its request for the Louisiana
Supreme Court to take the issue. The Fifth Circuit began by citing the trialjudge's conclusion that Stoute conflicted with Lewis. Chevron v. Vermillion
Parish School Bd., 364 F.3d 607, 610-11 (5th Cir. 2004). Yet the Fifth Circuit
admitted that Stoute does not "expressly consider whether a class demand letter
satisfies Article 137" and discussed the two Louisiana cases that do (Lewis v.
Texaco and Duhe v. Texaco) before incorrectly concluding that there "are
conflicting rulings on this point by the Louisiana Courts of Appeal." Id. at 610-
12.
The Fifth Circuit thus never demonstrated any actual conflict in Louisiana
law. And, after the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to hear the certified class-
notice question, the Fifth Circuit merely reiterated that "decisions of Louisiana
intermediate appellate courts are conflicting." Chevron v. Vermillion Parish
School Bd., 377 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2004). The court did, in a footnote, cite
Lewis and Duhe--which are not conflicting, and are the only intermediate
Louisiana cases to decide the issue--and Stoute, which does not contain a
holding on class notice. Id. at 461 n.2. The court then quickly went on to state
that "[e]ven if the Louisiana intermediate appellate court decisions were not in
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bonds, the panel decided Vermillion Parish through a feat of
judicial activism. Making an independent factual determination
that oil companies could not reasonably respond to class-wide
notice within the thirty-day statutory period (a factual
determination made without any evidence on the point), the court
found that the Louisiana Legislature therefore must not have
intended to allow class-wide pre-suit notice under the Mineral
Code. 133 Not only did the Fifth Circuit make this factual assertion
without evidence (or legislative history) supporting the corporate
protection it was writing into Louisiana law, but it never
mentioned the trial court's refusal, over class counsel's objection,
to permit the class discovery into this very issue (the ease of
response). Indeed, the trial court refused discovery even though
the class had accurately predicted that the oil companies would
exploit the absence of a record to make precisely these
unsupported factual arguments about the impossibility of
responding. 134  This example of conservative judicial activism
conflict" it would still perform its own textual analysis of Louisiana law in the
full Shelp tradition. Id. at 461-62.
133. 377 F.3d at 462-64.
134. When the putative class filed a motion to compel, after the oil
companies had refused to allow any discovery at all and would not produce a
single piece of paper, it predicted that the very companies claiming discovery
was irrelevant would argue on appeal that individual differences were so
complex that the class could not be certified--and that the class would be denied
the information needed to prove that the claims were very simple and common.
See, e.g., Motion to Compel Consolidated Oil Companies to Finally Allow the
Beginning of Certification Discovery, passim, Chevron v. Vermillion Parish
School Bd., Civil Action No. 00-0279 (Oct. 7, 2002). For instance, the class
pointed out that:
If the oil companies are not required to produce the documents that
show generally their payment practices for the class, they nonetheless
will argue to the court that numerous differences in those practices
should defeat certification. Yet they will have thwarted discovery that
would show, in reality, that they pay royalties and make NGL
adjustments based on common practices that are uniform throughout
Louisiana.
Id. at 9-10.
This is exactly what happened. The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that oil
companies could not reasonably be expected to respond to a class claim in thirty
days is a factual conclusion that is based on no evidence, and assumes facts on
the very topic on which the trial court refused discovery. Neither court gave the
class its day in court on this issue. While judicial efficiency requires federal
courts to keep their dockets moving, it should never be at the expense of the full,
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became possible only through the Fifth Circuit's use of Shelp as a
justification to disregard contrary on-point state law.1 35
This new and very activist federal engraftment onto the
Louisiana Mineral Code guarantees out-of-state oil companies that
whenever they are sued in a class action involving Louisiana
royalty owners, all they need to do is remove to federal court and
they will find an automatic exemption from class actions. For
instance, in recent briefing over a national class action for natural-
gas royalty owners against Exxon, a federal court did not even
have to reach the ordinary certification battle for the Louisiana
subclass, but simply denied Louisiana royalty owners any right to
participate because of Vermillion's holding on class notice. 136 This
extremely damaging dual system of law is exactly why Erie
instructed federal judges not to make their own determination of
state law.
This long line of cases, from Shelp in 1964 to the recent
Vermillion Parish decision, withholds the deference and respect
fair adjudication that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to ensure
all litigants, even if their claims are presented on a class basis.
In fact, the issue presented in each class notice was very simple and easy to
answer: Did the oil companies pass on the price they received for natural gas
and deduct only their actual, reasonable costs in making royalty payments?
Each company has uniform practices for paying royalties and their royalty
divisions could have told them whether they agreed with the claims the day they
received the class notice. The oil companies did not need a week, much less
thirty days, to know how they should respond.
135. In the first appeal, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case without decision
on jurisdictional grounds. Chevron v. Vermillion Parish School Bd., 294 F.3d
716 (5th Cir. 2002). The second time up, the court certified the notice issue to
the Louisiana Supreme Court. Chevron v. Vermillion Parish School Bd., 364
F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2004). Unfortunately, in spite of the great significance of this
issue to one of the major industries in Louisiana and to the hundreds of
thousands of royalty owners in that state, a significance so great that even the
trial court had certified its first decision as final so that the issue could go to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, Vermillion Parish, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 969, that court
refused to take the certified question without any explanation. See Chevron v.
Vermillion Parish School Bd., 872 So. 2d 533 (La. 2004).
136. Hunter v. Exxon, 2005 WL 357682 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2005). As the
court noted, in Vermillion the Fifth Circuit "seems to have foreclosed the
possibility of bringing the Louisiana claims." Id. at *5. While the court did
later determine on discretionary grounds that it should decertify the class for
other states, for Louisiana it did not even reach the merits of certification.
Vermillion is the equivalent of a "get out of court" card for any out-of-state oil
company sued in a purported class action involving Louisiana royalty owners.
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that Erie ordered federal courts to cede to their state counterparts
on issues of state law. 137  This novel Louisiana-only mutation
encourages and recreates the dual system of law Erie set out to
eliminate. It lets federal judges decide whether they agree with
existing Louisiana precedent, and whether they think they have a
better reading of the state's law than its own courts. Though
purportedly based on civilian interpretive principles that Louisiana
judges are supposed to apply, it confuses those principles with the
proper Erie question, namely, which body is the right one to apply
those principles. The end result is a unique disregard of the very
courts which Erie indicates are supposed to decide questions of
substantive state law.
As the next section shows, not all Fifth Circuit opinions
reviewing questions of Louisiana law have adopted the non-
deferential standard in Shelp and its progeny.
III. OTHER FIFT CIRCUIT DECISIONS CONTINUE TO ANALYZE
LOUISIANA LAW UNDER PROPER ERIE STANDARDS
One of the funny things about the no-deference Erie rule that
some Fifth Circuit panels have applied when deciding issues of
Louisiana law is that other Fifth Circuit panels, often with some of
the same judges, have approached the state's law by following its
intermediate state court decisions, as Erie requires, and have done
so without a hint of a special Louisiana no-deference rule. Their
approach is indistinguishable from an ordinary Erie federal court's
review of a substantive state law decision.
In Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc.,138 a
metal-working-machine manufacturer failed to install a press brake
safeguard before selling one of its machines to a small Louisiana
manufacturer. 139 A new employee iust out of high school crushed
his hand in one of the machines. 40 The case turned on what
137. See also American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Canal
Indemnity Co., 352 F.3d 254, 265 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing intermediate
decisions as only "secondary" authority, id. at 260-61, and stating that even if
those cases were on point, they would not have the "numerosity and unanimity
of decisions needed to rise to the level of jurisprudence constante, id. at 265).
138. 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990).
139. Id. at 170-71.
140. Id. at 171.
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product-liability standard applied, 141 and on whether the feasibility
of factory installation of a press brake safeguard by the
manufacturer, who did not necessarily know how the machine
would be used by a given customer, was relevant. 142 Because the
post-accident Louisiana Products Liability Act required proof that
alternative designs existed and could pass a cost-benefit analysis,
proof the Fifth Circuit felt the plaintiff had not met, 143 the decision
hung on whether this statute was retroactive. Applying Louisiana
law holding that procedural measures are retroactive unless the
legislature says otherwise, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Act
was indeed retroactive. 
144
The Lavespere court treated intermediate Louisiana cases on
legislative retroactivity as serious authority that it would have to
follow when applicable. It distinguished the one prior intermediate
case on the Act's retroactivity, which had held that the Act was not
retroactive, as dealing only with a substantive portion of the Act, 145
and carefully distinguished the machine maker's key pre-Act
141. Id. at 179, 181-83.
142. Id at 179-80.
143. Id. at 181.
144. Id. at 181-83.
145. Id. at 182-83 (discussing McCoy v. Otis Elevator Co., 546 So. 2d 229
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 636 (1989)). Lavespere treated
McCoy as limited to the reach of just one substantive portion of the Louisiana
Products Liability Act, the Act's exclusive-remedy section that eliminated the
cause of action for per se unreasonably dangerous products, a section McCoy
held could not be applied retroactively under Louisiana law. 910 F.2d at 182-
83. The Fifth Circuit cited authority that at least once in the past, Louisiana
courts had found some portions of a statute retroactive, and others not. See id. at
183 n.83.
Though the court distinguished Lavespere as involving the "procedural" issue
of the "burden of proof' for proving defective design in an elevator, see id. at
181-83, the cases were much closer than that. Both Lavespere and McCoy
involved alleged defects in elevators, and the added showing required of the
plaintiff in Lavespere sounds like part of the substantive cause of action.
Moreover, the second circuit's broad language in McCoy certainly sounded as if
it was classifying the entire statute, and not merely a portion of its provisions, as
substantive and therefore only prospective in application. Compare Lavespere,
910 F.2d at 182-83 with McCoy, 546 So. 2d at 232.
This purported distinction of McCoy shows how even under a traditional
standard of review, courts can skirt the import of Erie merely by redefining the
law. Yet plasticity exists under any legal test. One of the challenges of any
system of laws, those rooted in common law or in the civilian tradition, is that a
court can almost always find some distinction to separate a case before it from
past precedent. The plausibility of the distinction is a test of the integrity and
skill of the court.
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authority as also inapplicable. 146 The court gave not the slightest
hint that it could choose to disregard those decisions, had it thought
they applied, just because it disagreed with their interpretation of
Louisiana law.
Notably, Lavespere did not announce, as Judge Wisdom did in
Shelp, that because the court was interpreting a statute, it was free
to disregard contrary intermediate decisions made by state courts.
Lavespere contains no statements to the effect that it is a Code the
court was interpreting, and that Louisiana courts read their law
differently than other state courts do theirs. Though the Fifth
Circuit may have in fact disregarded at least one intermediate state
case, it buried that conflict without any affirmnative suggestion that
it was free to ignore the case or that federal courts have license to
disregard what intermediate Louisiana judges think about their
own law.
A more traditional Erie-deference opinion is a slightly later
case, Brocato v. Traina,147 a bankruptcy appeal that turned on
Louisiana's homestead exemption. 48 In a very short decision, the
Fifth Circuit cited the ordinary Erie duty to give "proper regard" to
decisions of Louisiana intermediate courts, found that those courts
had resolved the dispositive issue, and followed their lead. 149 The
court quoted the language of the homestead statute, but unlike a
true civilian court, it did not discuss what the language meant
before indicating its obeisance to intermediate state court
decisions. 150 This is the kind of deference envisioned in Erie.151
146. Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 184 (see discussion of Sawyer v. Niagara
Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 535 So. 2d 1057 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988), writ
denied, 536 So. 2d 1222 (1989)).
147. 30 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 642.
149. Id. at 642-43.
150. The only part of Brocato where the court addressed statutory language
is when it rebutted the appellants' claim that the homestead provision was
changed by the 1974 Constitution. Id. at 642. Even there, the court followed
intermediate state law in rejecting that argument. It cited a state court decision,
Gulfco Finance Co. v. Browder, 482 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), which
it took as binding, to clinch its conclusion that the Constitution did not change
this standard. Brocato, 30 F.3d at 643.
151. For another relatively early and deferential opinion, see Rogers v.
Corrosion Products, Inc., 42 F.3d 292 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1160,
115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995). The Rogers panel did offer a very loose version of the
Erie rule, that intermediate decisions are "given some weight, but they are not
controlling," but it did not suggest that this was a special Louisiana rule. Id. at
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Other Fifth Circuit decisions show similar respect to Louisiana
state court interpretations of Louisiana law, with nary a hint that
there should be a special discount applied against mid-level
Louisiana state court justice. In Matheny v. Glen Falls Insurance
Co., 152 an insurer tried to avoid paying for damages caused by an
uninsured motorist when the insured's son was killed in a car
accident. 153  The insureds had rejected uninsured motorist
coverage, but Louisiana law required insurers to re-offer uninsured
motorist coverage every time there was a "new" policy.154 The
Matheny court concluded that the plaintiffs had received a "new"
policy when they added their son to their existing coverage. 155 For
that reason, the insurer-who should have offered uninsured
motorist coverage again at that time, but did not-was on the hook.
This conclusion appeared after a five-page discussion focusing
almost entirely on intermediate state decisions. The court spent an
inordinate amount of time showing that it was construing state law
in accordance with Louisiana precedent, an entirely unnecessary
endeavor if it was free to blaze its own path through Louisiana's
civilian thicket without such deference. 1
56
Although the Fifth Circuit did cite one opinion in the no-
deference line for the proposition that intermediate authorities
"provide guidance, but are not controlling," mentioned an
underlying legislative policy favoring uninsured motorist coverage,
and suggested that "numerous decisions of the Louisiana Supreme
Court" (none actually cited in the opinion) reflected that
underlying policy, Matheny's ratio decidendi was derived entirely
from a universe of intermediate state decisions. 157 Here, again, one
finds none of the analysis a court would have had to undertake had
295. Moreover, it gave a painstaking analysis of the four intermediate state
cases and, because two contained only dicta, refused to follow them and instead
followed the other two in not suspending limitations for bankruptcy. Id. The
court reasoned that "the jurisprudence here counsels us not to broaden
suspension to include bankruptcy proceedings." Id. This is classic Erie
analysis.
152. 152 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 1998).
153. Id. at 349-50.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 350.
156. See id. at 350-54.
157. Id.
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it believed it could begin and end with the Code and commentators
interpreting it, with at best a bit role filled by intermediate judicial
authorities.
Another broadly deferential opinion, a classic Erie application,
is the Fifth Circuit's 2000 decision in Howe v. Scottsdale
Insurance Co. 158  The issue in Howe was whether a charity
hospital, one of whose patients had been injured in an auto
accident, had to pass on part of the patient's legal expenses from
the cost reimbursement the hospital received from the patient's
insurer. 159 By statute, Louisiana provided a medical lien privilege,
and allowed charity hospitals to intervene and protect their right to
reimbursement when the patient sued to seek his or her own
compensation. 16 In somewhat analogous situations, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had held that workers compensation carriers who
intervened to recover their costs had to bear a portion of an injured
worker's legal fees, and had even required that a health insurer
bear part of the recovery costs when it sued on a contractual right
to sue the tortfeasor. 161 But four of five intermediate state courts
had refused to extend that Supreme Court precedent to charity
hospitals, a rule that would reduce their recovery by making them
bear some of the patient's legal expenses.
162
Howe certainly presented a slate upon which a non-deferential
court could have written from the direct source materials of
Louisiana law. It invited a pure Code analysis in a circumstance
where the Louisiana Supreme Court had not squarely reached the
issue and intermediate courts were not unanimous (i.e., one state
court split with the other four). But the panel treated itself as
bound to follow the majority of intermediate state courts. It noted
that in the absence of direct Supreme Court precedent, the court
had to "seek guidance" from those court decisions. 163 Finding four
of five cases going one way, the court did not even identify the
158. 204 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2000).
159. Id. at 626-28.
160. Id. at 626 (listing medical lien privilege at La. R.S. 9:4752 (1991) and
authorization for charity hospital intervention in La. R.S. 46:7 (1999)).
161. Id. at 627-28 (citing Moody v. Arabie, 498 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986) and
Barreca v. Cobb, 95-1651 (La. 02/28/96), 668 So. 2d 1129).




lone contrary case. 164 Instead, it held itself unable to "disregard a
plethora of precedent provided by the intermediate appellate courts
of Louisiana," in the absence of any siAn that the Louisiana
Supreme Court would decide differently. 1  The court spent no
time on the purposes of the relevant statutes, the views of
commentators, or the language of the statutes (which receive much
more deference in civilian systems than in common law
adjudication). 166 It just followed the trend in intermediate state
decisions a la Erie. Thus here, too, a Fifth Circuit panel quite
correctly applied the general no-deference rule in effect since
1938.
Finally, in 2002 the Fifth Circuit issued another pure Erie
decision without suggesting any reason to lower its regard for
Louisiana intermediate state courts. In Patin v. Thoroughbred
Power Boats, Inc., 167 the key issue in a case decided under Florida
substantive law was whose law Louisiana would apply in a dispute
over piercing the corporate veil. 168 The Louisiana Supreme Court
had not spoken on the issue, but one intermediate Louisiana court
had.169 The Fifth Circuit recited the general mantra that it would
be "guided by the decisions of state intermediate appellate courts
unless other persuasive data indicates that the Louisiana Supreme
Court would decide otherwise.' 170 The court actually cited Texas
authority within the Fifth Circuit for the non-controversial, general
Erie standard, thus maintaining the general rule of high deference
to state courts without any exception for Louisiana. 17 1 Though the
Patin court did note that other federal courts had interpreted
Louisiana law the same way as the Louisiana intermediate court,172
the opinion gives no indication that it would have varied from
164. See id. (listing only the four supportive intermediate Louisiana
authorities).
165. Id.
166. See John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction
to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 20-26 (Stanford
Univ. Press 1969).
167. 294 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2002).
168. Id. at 646-47.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 646.
171. See id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of Durant v. Douglass, 142 F.3d 802,
809 (5th Cir. 1998)).
172. Id. at 646-47.
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Louisiana's intermediate decision if federal courts had disagreed
with the state case, or that the panel believed it needed to apply any
special rule to the issue. 173
Thus, contrary to Shelp and the other no-deference cases, a
separate line of Fifth Circuit decisions has continued to give
appropriate Erie respect to state court decisions. These cases avoid
creating a separate federal refuge for non-citizens seeking to avoid
the strictures of Louisiana law as decided by Louisiana's own
courts. These panels did not insist on adopting their own readings
of Louisiana law, even if they happened to think there was a better
rule than the one state courts had announced. They displayed a
full, proper understanding that under our federalist system,
Louisiana courts, even intermediate Louisiana state courts, are best
suited to determine their own law.
IV. THE NO-DEFERENCE RULE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
THWART ERIE
Not all federal cases treating a question of Louisiana law have
to take a stand on the deference due to state courts. A number of
Fifth Circuit opinions read as if they are ready to follow the special
Louisiana rule, but either find no state court conflict or find a
resolution in a manner that does not conflict with state cases.
These cases endorse Shelp's distinctive, non-deferential standard
of review in the comfortable realm of dicta, but they do not
173. For other cases applying Erie without suggesting a special Louisiana
exception, see Holden v. Connex-Metalma Management Consulting Group, 302
F.3d 358, 365-66 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2002) (following intermediate state court
decision, only authority on point, as "persuasive authority"); Scarborough v.
Northern Assurance Co., 718 F.2d 130, 134-37 (5th Cir. 1983) (following
intermediate state decisions on insurance coverage question and noting that
these decisions "are controlling, absent strong indication that the Supreme Court
of Louisiana would have decided them differently"); Cormier v.
Williams/Sedco/Horn Constructors, 460 F. Supp. 1010, 1012-13 (E.D. La.
1978) (following intermediate Louisiana courts on applicability of Jones Act,
and noting that "[r]e-examination of a state intermediate appellate court's
decision on an issue of state law is not something that this court will lightly
undertake."). The traditional analysis also appears in a case like Washington v.
Western & Southern Ins. Co., 107 Fed. Appx. 433, 435-36 (5th Cir. 2004), in
which the Fifth Circuit treated two conflicting intermediate decisions as serious
precedent with no suggestion that it was free to disregard that level of Louisiana
justice if it disagreed, as it decided another insurance coverage question.
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themselves disregard state court decisions.' 74  Other cases
involving Louisiana law sail through the at-times turbulent seas of
the Fifth Circuit without suggesting any lower-deference rule,
either because the Louisiana Supreme Court has spoken clearly on
the issue or because there is no intermediate state law to direct the
court.175  But as Shelp and its progeny show, the no-deference
174. One of these cases applied a rule of less deference because it was a tax
case, but did not cite any contrary intermediate decisions. This non-deferential
case does not fit the strict Erie category, given that it was a tax case. Delaune v.
United States, 143 F.3d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072,
119 S. Ct. 805 (1999), addressed whether Louisiana allowed renunciation of an
inheritance in the context of federal income tax. The standard of review applied
by the Fifth Circuit was a special rule for state-law questions decided in federal
income-tax disputes, a context in which the court concluded that the relevant
standard was that it "need accord no particular deference" to state decisions. Id.
at 1001-02. Delaune nonetheless has to be placed on the shelf near the Shelp
line of cases because it cited Shelp and its presumption that federal courts
making civil law interpretations undertake something "fundamentally different
from the common law process . . . ." See id. at 1002 & n.6. In an analysis very
similar to Shelp's, the court grappled with what it concluded was an inadvertent
omission of the term "repudiate" from the Digest of 1808 and subsequent codes;
discussed the language of the Code and commentators; and like Judge Wisdom
in Shelp, ended up applying the "clear French text" in the Code of 1825. Id. at
1003-05.
Another example of non-deferential dictum is a case over Louisiana's
statutory exemption of annuity contracts from debt liability, including seizure
under the federal bankruptcy laws. In re Orso, 283 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 2002).
The Fifth Circuit found the statute clear and unambiguous and did not cite any
contrary cases, even though it did endorse the civilian tradition and primacy of
the Code. Id. at 695 & n.29.
A third case cited the no-deference standard as background to a decision over
what it found to be an unambiguous property-insurance agreement, a conclusion
the court presumably would have reached in a common law jurisdiction as well.
Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indemnity Co., 179 F.3d 169 (5th Cir.
1999). The panel emitted civil overtones as it criticized the trial court for
beginning its analysis with a judicial decision, even though it was a Louisiana
Supreme Court decision. Id. at 173-74. For Prytania's stress on the contrary
civilian approach, see id. at 175 & n.9.
Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 319-21 (5th Cir. 1999), discussed
the special nature of Code adjudication, but only as a preface to explaining how
the retroactivity doctrine applies to a product-liability decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court. Hulin addressed the retroactivity of the Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La.
1986), superceded by statute, Louisiana Products Liability Act, 1988 La. Acts
No. 64, an opinion answering a question certified by the Fifth Circuit to the
Louisiana Supreme Court.
175. See, e.g., In re Liljeberg Enterprises, 304 F.3d 410, 424 (5th Cir. 2002)
(reciting general Erie standard), 454-55 (discussing "classic Erie question" but
finding neither caselaw nor statute to resolve it); Hawking v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 210 F.3d 540, 546-47 & n.21 (5th Cir. 2000) (factually distinguishing
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doctrine is extremely important because it can change case
outcomes when it does apply.
The Fifth Circuit's no-deference rule is an uneasy principle of
interpretation, as shown by the haphazard way that some panels
adopt the rule and others do not. That it is applied so
inconsistently is one sign that the Erie-for-Louisiana rule is in
trouble. The last two sections have shown that some panels start
off with the proposition that federal courts can treat intermediate
Louisiana courts in a much more cavalier fashion than intermediate
decisions from other states, and apply Shelp-like standards without
apology. A separate group of cases in the same general time
period approaches Louisiana law like any other state's law, without
any suggestion of a material difference. Some of the same judges
have sat on panels in both groups of cases. 176  Such internal
intermediate cases on agency issue), 548 (finding no Louisiana authority on
proper interpretation of Uniform Fiduciaries Act).
Another case distinguished a narrowly different intermediate Louisiana
decision because it turned on a contract not before the Fifth Circuit. See
Labiche v. Legal Security Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1994). In
Labiche, a subrogation dispute, the Fifth Circuit cited the loose language
favored by non-deferential courts that lower state court decisions "should be
given some weight, but they are not controlling," Id. at 351-52, yet nonetheless
went on to distinguish the potentially conflicting intermediate court decision as
if it had to take that precedent seriously. See id. at 353-54.
In 2001, the Fifth Circuit again decided an Erie case that was written in a way
to avoid suggesting any special rule of lesser deference. In Verdine v. Ensco
Offshore Co., 255 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2001), the issue was whether a contractor
was exempted from indemnification by Louisiana's Anti-Indemnity Act. Id. at
250. Intermediate state courts initially had read the Act's exemption broadly as
designed to protect oilfield contractors from "defense and indemnity provisions
forced on" them. Id. The Fifth Circuit then adopted a rule that would narrow
the exemption to agreements that pertained to a well or wells. Id. at 251. The
Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently adopted that narrower reading. Id. at
252-53. The Fifth Circuit thus was easily able to distinguish two contrary
intermediate Louisiana decisions that occurred before the Louisiana Supreme
Court adopted the Fifth Circuit interpretation. Id. at 252-53. Verdine also
recites the strong language of West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 61 S. Ct. 179 (1940),
that a reviewing court will not disregard intermediate decisions unless
"convinced by other persuasive data," Verdine, 255 F.3d at 252, with no
mention of any special rule.
176. For instance, Judge Higginbotham, who was a member of panels that
espoused the Shelp standard in Delaune v. United States, 143 F.3d 995 (5th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1072, 119 S. Ct. 805 (1999) (see supra note 174)
and Songbyrd v. Bearsville Records, Inc., 104 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 1997) (see
infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text) was also on panels that enunciated a
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inconsistency is one sign that there is something wrong with the
rule.
The plasticity of phrase and ease of verbal manipulation that
accompanies these mixed messages sends another warning call.
Appellate panels wanting to affirm what is, in their view, a better
rule provided by their own federal trial courts, tend to cite the
second half of West's admonition that the decisions of intermediate
courts, though a "guide," are not "controlling."' 177 They need not
be as blunt as Shelp itself, with its blunt phrase that "Erie does not
command blind allegiance to a case on all fours with the case
before the court." 178  Courts wanting to bestow proper Erie
rule of traditional deference in Howe v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824, 121 S. Ct. 68 (2000) (see supra notes 158-66
and accompanying text) and Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d
640 (5th Cir. 2002) (see supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text). Judge
Dennis, a member of the non-deferential panel in Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp.,
178 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999) (see infra note 174), nonetheless authored the
deferential Matheny v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 1998) (see
supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text). Judge Barksdale, who sat in with
the Vermillion Parish panel (see supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text),
also joined the traditionally deferential opinions in Matheny, Brocato v. Traina,
30 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 1994) (see supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text),
and Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859, 114 S. Ct. 171 (1993) (see supra notes 138-
46 and accompanying text). Judge Davis, who wrote the second and third
Vermillion Parish opinions and was on the Songbyrd panel, also joined the
opinion in Brocato. Judge Jones sat both in the nondeferential Prytania Park
Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indemnity Co., 179 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1999), but also
in the deferential Lavespere panel. All of these judges were on the en banc court
that endorsed the aggressively non-deferential, non-Erie test in In re Orso, 283
F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 2002) (supra note 174); yet a number of them also sat in the
cases discussed in supra note 175 that do not suggest any special Erie test, even
though not finding an actual conflict in Louisiana law needing resolution.
177. For instance, see Chevron v. Vermillion Parish School Board, 128 F.
Supp. 2d 961, 967 (W.D. La. 2001) (citing Rogers v. Corrosion Products, Inc.,
42 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1160, 115 S. Ct. 2614
(1995)), for this language. Rogers in turn cited Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 87 S. Ct. 1776, 1782 (1967), a somewhat irrelevant
case given the special standard of review in tax cases, for the proposition that
"decisions of lower state courts should be given some weight, but they are not
controlling where the highest state court has not spoken on the subject." Rogers,
42 F.3d at 295. Or consider Green v. Walker's rendition, citing West, that "[t]he
decision of an intermediate appellate state court guides, but does not necessarily
control a federal court's determination of the applicable state law." 910 F.2d
291, 294 (5th Cir. 1990).
178. Shelp v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 333 F.2d 431, 439 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct. 439 (1964).
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deference focus instead on the principle that in the absence of
"other persuasive data,"' 179 a federal court must follow its state
counterparts. When these courts also write about state decisions
being a "guide," they mean a guide one has to follow unless an
extraordinary roadblock forces one to take a different path.
180
When Shelp does apply, the made-for-Louisiana rule of
dismissive interpretation creates both of the evils that Erie
intended to eradicate. Linguistic games cannot hide the fact that
allowing federal judges a larger sphere in which they can accept or
reject the prior determinations of intermediate Louisiana courts
resurrects the dual system of law. Non-citizens receive an extra
chance to avoid state rules they do not like through the mere
expedient of going to federal court, and the discrimination and
disrespect that the Erie Court thought it had eradicated reappears
on the judicial landscape.
Such dual rules have a predictable impact on identifiable
classes of citizens and non-citizens. Louisiana is a very poor state.
As measured by the 2000 Census, Louisiana ranked forty-fifth in
the nation in average per-capita income ($21,794 for 1999), the
same rank it had in 1990.181 Fully 19.1% of the state's population
live below the poverty level, an abysmally high percentage
surpassed only by one other state, New Mexico (20.4%), and by
the District of Columbia (22.3%).182 The recent devastation from
two large hurricanes has weakened the state further. Like many
other poor states, Louisiana's economy depends heavily on out-of-
state corporations.
These large foreign corporations often invoke a federal court's
power in an effort to avoid settled Louisiana law. The existence of
a non-deferential backup federal forum gives these corporations an
added layer of protection against Louisiana citizens trying to
179. West, 311 U.S. at 237, 61 S. Ct. at 183.
180. Thus, for instance, when the Fifth Circuit spoke in Patin v.
Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 646 (5th Cir. 2002), of being
"guided by the decisions of state intermediate appellate courts," and in Howe v.
Scottsdale Insurance Company, 204 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2000), of seeking
"guidance" from intermediate courts, it meant actually following existing
decisions without second-guessing the state judges' analysis.
181. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000, at
460 tbl.1373 (120th ed. 2000).
182. Id. at 477 tbl. 759.
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enforce their own rights. Chevron v. Vermillion Parish is a prime
example. In that case, six out-of-state oil companies, including
two of the largest multinational companies in the world
(ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco), successfully sought out federal
jurisdiction to strip tens of thousands of Louisiana royalty owners
of their rights to initiate a class action under existing law in state
court. The pre-Erie dual system revived under the no-deference
rule is not just an abstract transfer of power from citizens to non-
citizens; it also represents a large shift of power from individuals
to wealthy non-citizen corporations. This is no victory for the
administration of justice.
The no-deference rule, of course, continues to spawn the other
Erie evil as well, damage to the federalist structure. Because
Louisiana is a civilian rather than common law state, when federal
judges assume greater power to wade directly into Louisiana law,
they are necessarily encouraged to disregard Louisiana judges'
capability to decide their own law. When the Shelp opinion
portrayed an embarrassingly contrary decision of the Louisiana
second circuit as a "single, aberrant deviation,"'183 when the court
in Green v. Walker gave short shrift to an arguably controlling
state court decision because it viewed Louisiana cases as merely
"secondary information, ' 184 when the Fifth Circuit in FDIC v.
Abraham announced that it was "chary to rely on" a contrary first
circuit opinion, 185 or, most stunningly of all, when the Fifth
Circuit, in a case discussed below, announced that it need not even
account for opinions of the Louisiana Supreme Court unless they
reached the density of jurisprudence constante,18 6 federal courts
are injecting the "disturbing and irritating" disruption into state and
federal relations that Justice Field bemoaned in Baltimore & Ohio
183. Shelp, 333 F.2d 431, 439 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct.
439 (1964). For a discussion of Shelp, see supra notes 69-90 and
accompanying text.
184. 910 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). For a discussion of
Green, see supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
185. 137 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1998). For a discussion of Abraham, see
supra notes 104-20 and accompanying text.
186. Songbyrd, Inc. v. Bearsville Records, Inc. 104 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824, 121 S. Ct. 68 (2000). For a discussion of
Songbyrd, see infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
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Railroad187 and that Erie sought to remove from federal
jurisprudence.
Justifying a federal court's disregard of a Louisiana state
decision on the theory that Louisiana judges are not as tightly
bound by precedent as judges in common law states fails to answer
either the federalist problem or the dual-system problem. A
federal judge is still free to indulge a personal view that a state
judge got it wrong. Erie is designed to prevent federal judges from
using mere disagreement as an excuse to ignore a state decision.
When a federal judge downplays the opinion of a state counterpart
in the belief that the latter did not properly apply state interpretive
principles (for instance did not read the Code or commentators
correctly), the federal judge is really just disagreeing with the state
judge's reasoning. In Louisiana, unlike common law states, that
reasoning may tend to favor the Code and commentary more than
jurisprudence, but the Louisiana non-deference exception to Erie
still represents no more than the federal judge rejecting the
thinking of the state judge and substituting his or her own ideas.
The damage from this violation is no less severe because the
disregarded state opinion concerns more statute and less caselaw
than might occur in a common law jurisdiction.
It is one sign of just how extreme the Shelp principle really is
that its logic does not stop with intermediate state court decisions.
If cases are much less the foundation of law in Louisiana compared
to other states, and if this difference frees federal courts from their
ordinary respect for state decisions, there is no reason to defer to
the Louisiana Supreme Court either. Shelp originated from an
effort to dodge one intermediate decision, and all but one of the
Shelp line of opinions seem to be aimed at avoiding intermediate
state court opinions. But the rationale for a standard of reduced
deference is just as applicable to the decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
In 1997, a Fifth Circuit panel, at least in articulation, took
Shelp all the way. In Songbyrd, Inc. v. Bearsville Records, Inc.,
188
the court confronted whether an action to recover master tapes
187. 149 U.S. 368, 403, 13 S. Ct. 914, 928 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, see supra notes 25-28.
188. 104F.3d 773.
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made by "Professor Longhair," a well-known New Orleans
rhythm-and-blues pianist, was subject to "liberative" (statutory) or
"acquisitive" (possessory) prescription. 18 9  The substantive
discussion began with a traditional Shelp approach emphasizing
the secondary nature of judicial decisions in Louisiana. 19° In true
civilian fashion, the panel analyzed the Code and the views of a
leading commentator, Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos of Tulane
University, before turning to Louisiana precedent. 19 1 In reviewing
the available jurisprudence, the panel found conflicting Louisiana
Supreme Court authority and noted that the most recent
"pronouncement" of that court supported the panel's reading.'9 2
The panel also held, however, that in the absence of jurisprudence
constante, the line of precedent required for a rule to be binding
within the Louisiana state court system, it could refuse to be bound
by precedent even though the decision came from Louisiana's
highest court:
But regardless whether the most recent pronouncement of
the Louisiana Supreme Court supports our analysis of the
Civil Code and that of Professor Yiannopoulos, there is
simply no jurisprudence constante on the question. It
follows, then, that our Erie-bound decision to follow the
plain wording and indisputable structure of the Louisiana
Civil Code and Professor Yiannopoulos' analysis is either
supported by or at least does no violence to Louisiana's
jurisprudence as a secondary source of law. 193
What the Fifth Circuit was thus saying, at least in dictum, was
that in the absence of a long line of Louisiana Supreme Court
cases, a Fifth Circuit panel need not be bound by decisions of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, even if such decisions are clear and on-
point. Federal courts could wield the doctrine of jurisprudence
constante to avoid a single decision or even a handful of decisions
of the state supreme court any time their own readings of the law
seem more beguiling. This set of circumstances demonstrates the
189. Id. at 777.
190. See id. at 776.
191. Id. at 777-78.
192. Id. at 778-79.
193. Id. at 779.
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pure, unadulterated logic of Shelp, and in the clarity of Songbyrd's
expression, renders Shelp's extremism plain for all to see.
The low-deference, often no-deference Louisiana rule is
particularly odd because, recalling Justice Holmes's argument in
his Black & White Taxicab dissent before Erie, the unique civilian
characteristics of Louisiana's state law should make federal judges
particularly wary of unilaterally deciding issues that the state's
courts have already addressed. 94 In questioning the need for a
general federal common law, Justice Holmes's choice of Louisiana
as an example reflected his understanding that, particularly in
Louisiana, the state with the most distinctly different system of
jurisprudence, federal judges should not meddle with state affairs.
Though fortunately the Shelp non-deference rule has been
limited thus far to intermediate state courts, Songbyrd is correct
that the logic of the non-deference position applies just as clearly
to decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. If federal courts are
free to treat Louisiana law as different and non-precedential; if
they can disregard the two institutional problems that motivated
Erie itself, the discriminatory dual-system of law and the affront to
the federalist structure; if they can go straight to the Code without
worrying overmuch about how state courts have read the Code; if
they can so skirt the views of state judges generally, nothing in the
Shelp's logic says that they can do so for intermediate courts but
not the Louisiana Supreme Court itself. This final extension shows
how contrary the special Louisiana rule is to Erie itself.
Federal courts should return to the unalloyed deference
commanded by Erie. It is time to jettison the appealing license for
federal judges to decide Louisiana state law that is the dubious
legacy of Shelp.
194. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.

